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Abstract
This thesis is about industrial organization in EU power generation. The
power sector is critically important to the eﬃcient functioning of modern
economies, and generation is the source of the majority of value-added in the
production chain, as well as approximately one third of the EU’s greenhouse
gas emissions. The European Commission cherishes a vision of a single inter-
nal market in electricity (and gas) and to that end has subjected the sector to
a sustained reform programme, administered by Directorates General Com-
petition and Energy, aimed at bringing about a less concentrated market
structure.
Despite this ambitious objective, little is known about the corporate
strategies that have been pursued by leading power generators in response
to sector liberalization, or about the cumulative eﬀect of these strategies on
sectoral structure at the aggregate EU level. The objective of this thesis is
to begin to rectify this omission, and to evaluate progress towards the single
market. An intensive data gathering exercise culminated in the creation of a
unique and comprehensive database, the market share matrix of EU power
generation, which contains estimates of the size of leading generators, disag-
gregated by member state. The matrix has supported chapters examining
concentration and firm growth, firm multinationality and the diﬀusion of
wind turbines.
EU energy policy has been described as “a litmus test for the usefulness
of the European Union as an institution”. The evidence presented in this
thesis suggests that the eﬀectiveness of the liberalization agenda has been
limited. Ten years after the First Electricity Directive, the hypothetical
single market has become more, not less concentrated as a result of corporate
growth strategies, and the new ‘competitive’ market structure has failed to
deliver high levels of diﬀusion of a carbon-neutral generation technology.
Elizabeth A. Hooper
Thesis title: Competition and Innovation in the Newly Liberalized European
Power Industry
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CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about the industrial organization of power1 generation in the
European Union (EU) over a period when market integration was a key
objective of EU policy. A focus on this particular sector is warranted since
its practical importance is far greater than its share of GDP which is about
2% in typical developed economy (Pollitt, 1999, p.29). Or, as the DG for
Energy website puts it “Energy is what makes Europe tick”(DG Tren, 2010).
Refining the focus further to power generation is justified by the fact that
it is this stage in the production chain that gives rise to the majority of the
value-added created in the electricity sector.
By teasing out specific aspects of firm strategy over an extended period,
inferences have been drawn regarding the nature of the competitive process
in the sector. While the essentially descriptive findings of the work are of
significant interest, the thesis is located squarely in the academic literature on
industrial organization (IO). By teasing out specific aspects of firm strategy
over an extended period, inferences have been drawn regarding the nature of
the competitive process in the sector. Given the political context in which it is
set and the high degree of politicization in the sector, the findings of the study
represent an evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of EU energy and competition
policy.
1The terms power and electricity are synonymous throughout the thesis.
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Contemporary debates in both academic literature and policy circles have
motivated and guided the progress of the research project. The European
Commission’s (EC) liberalization agenda has the declared objective to create
a single market for electricity and at first there were positive signs that
competition was emerging. A rudimentary assessment of progress can be
gleaned from examination of the wholesale power price curve in the EU.
Figure 1.12 shows price development for year ahead base-load between 2000
and 2006 and for key EU member state markets. The first stages of the EU’s
liberalization programme were embodied in the First Electricity Directive
which came into force in early 1997 (EC, 1996), so by 2000 a price impact
may have begun to feed through to forward prices.
Source: Sector Inquiry (EC, 2006, p.111)
Figure 1.1: Wholesale electricity price, year ahead base-load. 2000-2006
The figure indicates that between 2000 and mid 2003 wholesale prices re-
mained largely stable and the dispersion between prices prevailing in diﬀerent
countries was relatively modest. This stability in part reflected stable input
prices and the rising trading volumes on power exchanges which increased
2Unfortunately the underlying data for this figure was not available. It has been re-
produced from the Sector Inquiry and the quality of the image is not ideal.
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arbitrage opportunities. During 2004, the pattern changed in three distinct
ways. First, the trend turned sharply upward, which may be explained by
several factors. Input prices, particularly natural gas, were rising strongly.
One possible explanation is that the potential cost savings resulting from lib-
eralization (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997) had in large measure been realized by
2003 so were no longer suﬃciently strong to mitigate rising input prices, par-
ticularly natural gas. Alternative explanations are that prices are positively
related to product market concentration and that low levels of liquidity are
associated with high prices, both of which find empirical support in Slade
and Thille (2006). Second, price volatility grew substantially, perhaps due
to low trading volumes at the power exchanges, a factor that may drive the
third observed change in price curve, increasing dispersion. With deep and
liquid wholesale markets and absent other constraints such as congestion over
the hight voltage network and interconnectors, traders would be expected to
realize profit opportunities by trading to minimize price diﬀerentials. The
data show that there was insuﬃcient activity to prevent significant diﬀeren-
tials from persisting which implies the presence of barriers to trade; markets
were insuﬃciently integrated.
The price curve is suggestive of underlying problems, but without addi-
tional data it is diﬃcult to identify the price eﬀects of short run factors such
as a tight supply/demand balance or the strategic exercise of market power
by, for example, withholding capacity. It is well known that detecting (the
abuse of) market power in electricity markets is fraught with diﬃculty (e.g.
Borenstein et al., 1999, Smeers, 2009); this route is not pursued in this thesis.
Instead, the analysis is focused not on market power, but on competition in
a dynamic (neo-Schumpeterian) rather than neoclassical (static) framework.
In a dynamic setting the emphasis shifts from the assessment of market power
to potential competition and firm behaviour (Sidak and Teece, 2009). A new
framework was developed in which the trajectories of both market shares
and concentration in capacities were calculated for a ten year period, then
by testing behavioral models, key firm strategies that resulted in leadership
were identified.
Despite the rhetoric surrounding the single electricity market, both aca-
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demics and policy makers have neglected the structural aspects of power
generation at the EU level, so very little is known about them. The main-
stream academic peer-reviewed literature appears to be devoid of any study
that examines sectoral structure at the EU level, although the O¨ko Institute
has published two studies that examine one aspect of market structure, con-
centration in generation at the regional (and national) level (Matthes et al.,
2007). Somewhat surprisingly given the EC’s single market ambitions and
general dissatisfaction with the pace of reform, the recent Sector Inquiry (EC,
2006) conducted by the Directorate General (DG) for Competition focused
on the health of competition at the national level. The resultant report that
ran to over 360 pages discussed concentration in some detail but was entirely
unencumbered by any mention of the concept of aggregate concentration, i.e.
concentration at the sectoral level.
Yet aggregate concentration is germane to the entire liberalization project.
If the objective is to create a single market in electricity, a study that evalu-
ates progress towards and barriers to the achievement of that objective needs
to relate the desired future state to the status quo. The diﬃculty is that it is
not possible to predict the future accurately, however we do know the broad
dimensions of the EC’s vision; transmission constraints and bottlenecks are
non-binding and barriers to trade are low, so a hypothetical market investi-
gation would define ‘the market’ as the EU. The analysis presented in this
thesis was motivated by considering the likelihood that the single electricity
market will be achieved given recent developments in the EU power sector.
While many of the the myriad questions that arose during the course
of the project must remain as topics for future research, a fascinating story
has been crafted by exploring the following questions in the context of the
hypothetical single market in electricity that is nevertheless, the stated ob-
jective of EU energy policy: What does the structure of the sector look like?
How have market participants’ strategies have shaped that structure? How
dominant are the giant firms in the sector? How have mergers aﬀected the
structure of the sector? Will competition help or hinder the goal of attaining
carbon-neutral generation sector? What does all this mean for competition
policy in the sector?
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This chapter is laid out as follows: key features of the policy background
is set out in section 1.1 before the academic roots of the thesis are discussed
in section 1.2. The methodological foundations of the study are outlined in
section 1.3 and key findings summarized in section 1.4. The final section
provides a guide to the body of the thesis.
1.1 The policy background
The reform of Europe’s network industries was precipitated by several fac-
tors: ageing infrastructure and technological advances demanded investment
at a time of perceived ineﬃciency in network utilities and when national
governments were more interested in raising cash (by selling assets) than
making large capital investments in infrastructure. Newbery (2002, p.1-2)
characterizes the problem of network industries as one of balancing the in-
terests of investors and consumers. Network utilities require a fixed network
in order to deliver services to final consumers, so the networks are classic
natural monopolies which create rents which are persistent because the net-
works are durable. Network investment is a large sunk cost which means that
bargaining power shifts towards consumers, but the large number of (rela-
tively) small consumers must link directly to the network in order to receive
the product, so network owners can potentially exploit consumers who have
limited substitution possibilities.
Prior to the 1980s Europe’s network industries had been under close
scrutiny by the state and protected from competition and were in many
cases monopolies bounded by national borders. As a result, the shift in Eu-
ropean economic policy during the late 1980s which prioritized the removal
of barriers to trade and competition and the formation of the single mar-
ket for goods and services, had particularly large implications for network
industries.
Reform in the power sector was formally set in train by the First Electric-
ity Directive 96/92/EC. The key objective of the liberalization programme
is not mere harmonization but integration: the creation of a single internal
market for electricity (EC, 1996). This is indeed a mighty ambition. In ad-
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dition to the specific problems associated with network industries, the social
and political context of electricity supply is particularly complex. The pub-
lic service obligation and concerns about fuel poverty, the extent to which
the sector is embedded in the political system, and the environmental exter-
nalities associated with electricity generation all contribute to the challenge
of liberalization as does the path dependency of market structure (Sutton,
1998, Kreps and Spence, 1985) and the universal preference of national gov-
ernments for energy independence. A final complication related to energy
independence is derived from the increasing trend towards the building of
‘national champions’ (Domanico, 2007). Developing competitive markets at
national level and building a national champion may be mutually exclusive.
As a consequence of all these factors, the story of power sector reform is one
of of hard fought negotiations between the EC, national governments and
regulators that is punctuated by legislative packages3 and the Sector Inquiry
(EC, 2006).
Central to reform in the electricity sector is the replacement of monopoly
with competition (Olsen and Skytte, 2003, p.179) where possible, and the
use of regulation to prevent participants from exploiting market power in
the newly competitive set up. Hence the development of regulatory insti-
tutions capable of balancing competing interests of consumers and produc-
ers/network owners is of critical importance (Newbery, 2002, p.3). The objec-
tives of EU energy policy are to ensure a competitive, secure and sustainable
electricity supply so the reality of public policy with respect to electricity
is particularly complicated and it falls under the auspices of three diﬀerent
Directorates General: energy, competition and environment. The challenge
of reconciling strongly held positions such that the EU does indeed meet
its objectives with respect to energy is immense, but is of great importance
to the European Union project. If energy policy can fairly be described as
“a litmus test for the usefulness of the European Union as an institution”
(Roller et al., 2007), then this study may be considered the litmus paper.
3The Second Electricity Directive 03/54/ED, the Cross Border Electricity Trading Reg-
ulation EC 1228/2003 and the “Third Package”.
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1.2 Academic roots
The intellectual foundations of the study are found in IO, and a particu-
lar emphasis is placed on corporate strategy. Vickers (1995) diﬀerentiates
between allocative, productive and dynamic eﬃciency but static analysis re-
mains the central concern of much economic theory (Sidak and Teece, 2009)
and a ‘healthy’ level of competition is widely equated with low prices. Hence
academic analysis of the adequacy (or otherwise) of the level of competition
in any given market is based primarily on allocative eﬃciency (e.g Wad-
dams Price and Harker, 2006) or productive eﬃciency (e.g. Newbery and
Pollitt, 1997, Jamasb et al., 2010). In section 1.1 it was argued that reform
in the electricity sector was motivated by technological change, i.e. by the
desire to introduce product and process innovations, which is precisely the
nature of dynamic competition described in Schumpeter (1942) “... it is dy-
namic competition propelled by the introduction of new products and new
process that really counts.”, though this definition of dynamic competition
is rather looser than the one that has recently become more conventional.
IO studies continue to reflect the dominant logic that market structure
is the primary determinant of innovation, and by implication, dynamic com-
petition, despite theoretic inadequacies (Sidak and Teece, 2009) and mixed
empirical evidence (Cohen and Levin, 1989). This may be in part due to
the pervasive and restrictive interpretation of the term industrial structure
whereby it is equated with concentration; see for example, (Sutton, 1998,
p.5), (Hay and Morris, 1991, p.207) as well as the Sector Inquiry (EC, 2006)
and Matthes et al. (2007) discussed above.
A broad definition of industrial structure can be decomposed into its
constituent parts from which evidence of the strategic decisions of market
participants may be recovered. For example, Aghion et al. (2009, p.2) have
recently argued forcefully in the context of the adoption of green technologies
“the portfolio of technologies available tomorrow depends on what is done
today”. It seems obvious that modelling the various elements of structure
as a set of characteristics that depend delicately on each other lays the basis
for research capable of generating a fuller and more nuanced understanding
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of structure than one derived from a more restricted conceptualization.
Examining the nature of competition in the long run is interesting because
it is possible to observe firm behavior and together with some measure of firm
performance, evidence can be assembled regarding the strategies that give rise
to leadership and some predictions made about the way in which competition
may develop in the future. Given this interest in the long run development
of the competitive environment, installed capacity was the chosen measure
of firm size. While not unprecedented, capacity is an unusual choice and
its special significance in electricity markets is addressed in chapter 2. The
majority of the analysis in the academic literature is indeed static and in
the short run capacity is not a good measure because it is the marginal cost
of the marginal plant that sets prices and the relationship between capacity
and marginal cost is not clear. However capacity as a measure of size over
the long run has two tremendous advantages. First, it is the realization of
firm strategy in the sense that the capacity of a firm today is the outcome of
their investment decisions in the past and beliefs about their likely position in
the market in the future. Thus firm strategy may be inferred from changes
in firm size, and predictions made about the eﬀect of diﬀerent strategies
on competition in the future. Second, as Nilsson (2005) argues, capacity is
the obvious measure of firm size because capacity can be expected to exert
negative pressure on prices in the long run.
The case study is capable of generating an array of detailed information
about a sector which can be particularly helpful in the sector is particularly
complex, undergoing reform or that for some other reason merits specific
attention. Electricity qualifies on all three criteria. However, the approach
taken in the thesis provides a blueprint that could be applied in many other
sectors undergoing, particularly telecommunications and perhaps more perti-
nent in the current political climate, water. In the context of induced market
integration, conducting analysis under the ‘what if’ assumption is a valid and
indeed important step that links the (desired) future with the present and
the past.
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1.3 Methodological contribution
Based on an original data set, the thesis assembles for the first time a wealth
of new information about the sector and provides a unique and comprehen-
sive overview of the dynamics of sectoral structure that is at the same time
abundant in detail.
The study is faithful to the methodology developed by Davies and Lyons
(1996) which examined the industrial structure of the EU across sectors and
which is extended in two respects which makes it better suited to the ob-
jectives of this work. The beauty of the matrix methodology is its ability
to generate a rich and complex story of the evolution of industrial structure
but at the same time being relatively concise. It is flexible enough to permit
analysis of structure at the firm, member state, regional or EU level and is
therefore capable of supporting research that seeks to provide an overview of
sectoral (or industrial) structure but that also drills down to examine ques-
tions such as, what is the role of firm nationality or the membership of a
regional market in changing structure?
Key objectives of the study were the examination of the way in which
sectoral structure had changed since the liberalization process began, and
the identification of the firm strategies that result in sectoral leadership.
However absent significant resources available for large scale data collection,
specific firm strategies for example R&D expenditure or prices, are unob-
servable. But the outcomes of past strategies are observable, for example in
the form of market shares or firm multinationality. The desire to generate a
comprehensive dynamic view therefore necessitated the collection of at the
very least, two cross-sections of data separated by a number of years – this
approach was taken by Clarke (2002). However in view of the emphasis on
the response of firm strategy to the policy environment it was decided that a
panel of ten years should be constructed. Outcomes observed over a ten year
period represent a reliable and consistent record of the eﬀect of firm level
decisions on several aspects of industrial structure. The panel approach had
the added advantage of easing any econometric problems associated with the
relatively small number of firms on which data was to be gathered.
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The second respect in which the power generation matrix diﬀers from
the industry matrix of Davies and Lyons is in scale. The latter based their
presentation of the first comprehensive picture of the industrial structure of
the EU on a matrix that covered all 11 member states4. The present study is
similarly representative of the EU as a whole, but a series of EU expansions
required the inclusion of 25 countries5. The generation matrix is four times
larger than the industry matrix.
1.4 Summary of results
The thesis does not provide evidence that could lead the EC to the conclusion
that the reform programme initiated by the First Electricity Directive is an
overwhelming success. Progress towards a single internal market in power
generation is slow and the current trajectory does not inspire optimism that
this objective will be reached in the short term.
Concentration has risen as a consequence of the growth strategies of lead-
ing firms which have been executed very largely through merger, and firms
have become considerably more multinational. It is possible that and envi-
ronment in which there are fewer, larger firms reflects the fact that the most
eﬃcient firms have prospered at the expense of their ineﬃcient rivals, which
may be of benefit to consumers (if firms pass through cost savings). Another
possibility is that as a result the strategies pursued by leading generators,
the structure of the sector was more conducive to tacit collusion at the end
of the period than it was at the start. However, the study does not provide
evidence which could inform choosing between these possibilities.
The new ‘competitive’ market regime has not brought forth high levels
of low carbon generation technologies, and since diﬀusion was found to be
inversely related to concentration in a firm’s domestic market, the trend to-
wards more concentrated markets may have a negative eﬀect on the diﬀusion
of low carbon generation technologies. However, by implementing a method-
4Belgium and Luxembourg were treated as one.
5EU27 plus Norway, minus Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta. See chapter 2 for full
details.
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ology which allowed us to decompose overall diﬀusion into its component
parts, we showed that the constraint on more intense diﬀusion lies within
the firm, not between firms. This is an important finding which has direct
policy implications.
1.5 A guide to the thesis
The body of the thesis is organized as follows: the data underlying the em-
pirical analysis that is at the heart of the work is put through its paces in the
next chapter. The project was data-intensive and the methodological contri-
bution of the thesis relies on the market share matrix for generation, which
makes the ‘data chapter’ particularly important. Since the three substan-
tive chapters are drawn from distinct but related literatures, each chapter
discusses the relevant literature.
The first aspect of sectoral structure examined is the distribution of firms.
In chapter 3 patterns of firm growth are analyzed in detail and changes in
the distribution traced out. A particularly interesting aspect of the analysis
concerns the contribution of mergers to the firm enlargement story. Chapter 4
presents analysis of the multinational strategies pursued by leading firms by
asking the question, why does a firm decide to locate their generation assets
across member states? The final aspect of firm strategy that is scrutinized
concerns the diﬀusion of wind turbines both across and within firms, and is
the subject of chapter 5. The final chapter brings together the key findings
and discusses directions for future research.
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CHAPTER
TWO
THE MARKET SHARE MATRIX
2.1 Introduction
A principal objective of this thesis is to document and present empirical
analysis of the structural changes in EU power generation since the start of
the sector liberalization process. Data on leading firms that is essential to
a comprehensive description of the industry have been assembled into the
market share matrix for EU power generation, which is discussed in detail in
this chapter.
In the next section the chosen measure of firm size is explained, and in
section 2.3 existing publicly available sources of data on the European gen-
eration sector discussed. As it happens, this section provides the rationale
for the resource intensive exercise involved in the creation of the matrix.
The next three sections outline the logic for the creation of the matrix, the
methodology used in its construction and the data gathering process. The
dimensions of the matrix and some preliminary analysis are reported in sec-
tions 2.6 and 2.8. Finally, both the capabilities and deficiencies of the matrix
are discussed in section 2.9.
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2.2 Measuring firm size
Firms in this sector report their size according to several diﬀerent measures,
including revenue, production volumes and installed capacity. For the pur-
poses of this study, installed capacity is the chosen measure since we wish
to capture the long run adjustments to the structure of the sector that are
reflected in changes in capacity. The selection of this measure yields at least
two significant advantages over the alternatives. First, the longevity (20–60
years) and high capital cost of generation assets implies that investments in
capacity reflect the beliefs of firms regarding their ability to generate rev-
enue in a particular market in the long run. Second, it permits abstraction
from short run supply and demand factors which, given the requirement for
continual balancing of supply and demand, are likely aﬀect other measures
of size.
The choice of size as a measure is far from unprecedented. For example
Nilsson (2005) argues that it is the appropriate measure given that in the long
run downward pressure on prices will be determined by spare capacity or,
equivalently in his set-up, the intensity of post-merger competition by idle ca-
pacity. Similarly, for the cement industry Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) study
concentration based on kiln capacity as the measure of firm size. Finally, the
European Commission (EC) report shares of available installed capacity as a
measure of concentration in the Sector Inquiry (EC, 2006) that was carried
out by the Directorate General for Competition. Available capacity is equal
to the sum of maximum operating capacity for each unit in a firm’s portfolio,
so takes account of derating due to hot weather and also capacity that is oﬀ
the system having been mothballed, or due to planned or unplanned out-
ages. Total installed capacity is arguably at least as good a measure since it
does not reflect strategic withholding that may aﬀect estimates of available
installed capacity.
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2.3 Existing sources of data
Existing data sources were identified by following a three step approach.
First oﬃcial data sources were explored, then proprietary sources examined,
and finally the possibility that data from existing academic studies may be
available was assessed.
For the UK, the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
publishes data on the ownership of power plants in its Digest of UK Energy
Statistics (DUKES) database, but the same is not true for most other mem-
ber states. The EC does not publish data on plant capacities or ownership.
During the course of the the Sector Inquiry (EC, 2006) the EC collected
data on ownership of capacity in their member state of origin, from which
the domestic share of available capacity for each firm was estimated. How-
ever, the data do not include capacity owned in member states other than
the member state of origin, which given high levels of multinationality and
the single market ambitions of the EC, seems to have been a missed oppor-
tunity. Subsequent to the Sector Inquiry, market studies were commissioned
from consortia lead by London Economics, but again these were restricted
to national markets, and no underlying firm level data were made available.
In the absence of oﬃcial data, the availability of proprietary data was
investigated. The Yearbook of the European Energy and Raw Materials In-
dustry (Meller, 2008) claims to provide comprehensive details of more than
4000 companies and organizations, including operational and locational infor-
mation, and was recommended as a useful source of data. The publication
certainly appears to regard itself as the standard reference guide1. Data
from this source was obtained for 2004 but checks on its robustness2 revealed
it to be inaccurate in respects that rendered it unsuitable for the current
project. Unfortunately the cost of other proprietary sources of data, for ex-
ample Platts’ Electric Power Plants Database, exceeded the limited resources
available for this project.
The last avenue explored was the academic literature. Matthes et al.
1http://www.energy-yearbook.de/
2Ownership data on UK generation plants was compared with the DUKES database
discussed above.
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(2007) assess the evolution of concentration between 1996 and 2004 in a
limited number of member states, and for regions defined by physical power
flows. The data employed in the analysis was taken from the O¨ko-Instiut’s
power generation database, itself gathered from company annual reports and
other sources. However, the unit of observation was net power generation,
which is likely to be influenced by short term supply and demand factors
as well as strategic issues including the control of power generation assets,
and there is no way to disentangle short and long run eﬀects. The paper
claims to present “a clear picture of market concentration in the liberalized
power generation markets in Europe” (Matthes et al., 2007, p.18). While
the report is helpful because it begins to address the striking lack of analysis
of concentration in power generation at higher levels of aggregation than
the member state, this claim seems a little exaggerated. The analysis is
focused at the market (national or regional) level and does not attempt to
make connections that become obvious if the EC is considered as a whole.
For example, the study fleetingly asserts the importance of mergers in the
increasing concentration in German power markets but does not consider
the wider potential for mergers to increase concentration at a higher level of
aggregation.
In summary, an extensive search revealed that with the possible exception
of costly proprietary data, high quality and publicly available data on the
ownership of power plants in Europe is virtually non-existent. Given the high
profile of the sector and the prominence of the EC’s goal of creating a single
internal market in electricity, this is remarkable in itself and is a plausible
explanation for the absence of analysis of the structure of the industry at
the aggregate EU level. It had become clear that it would be necessary to
compile a new database specifically for the purpose of this analysis. The next
section introduces the database concept.
However before moving on, it is worth discussing the likely accuracy of the
data. The quality of the data is as good as the source material, largely annual
reports and websites. It is probable that firms know their own capacities but
there may be changes in measurement and reporting that are obscured from
the reader. Errors introduced in this way could not be detected. Further, the
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lack of a common reporting framework meant that the exercise of judgement
and in one or two cases guesswork, was required. The novelty of the thesis is
derived in part by the lack of existing data, so it was not possible to evaluate
the accuracy of the data against a comprehensive existing source. However,
partial checks against other sources suggest the resulting estimates to be
broadly correct.
2.4 The market share matrix
2.4.1 The concept
The matrix is based on a concept developed by Davies and Lyons (1996) to
study the structure of manufacturing in the EU, and employed subsequently
by Clarke (2002) to examine the structure of food retailing in the EU. The
idea is to compile a database that gives the size of each leading firm in each
EU country. Such a database would support the examination of the structure
of firms and the sector as a whole at the aggregate EU, regional or member
state level. Given the interest in the degree to which large firms have shaped
industry structure it seems logical to concentrate on firms that are among the
largest in their member state of origin. A fragment of the matrix is presented
below, but before discussing that, several definitional issues are dealt with.
2.4.2 Definitions
The precise definitions used in construction of the matrix are given in this
section.
The industry
The electricity industry is comprised of four vertically related segments, gen-
eration, high-voltage transmission, low-voltage distribution and finally sup-
ply (or retail). The focus throughout the thesis is power generation, for
three reasons. First power generation is responsible for the large majority
of value-added created by the entire production chain; second, generation
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was the first segment to be opened to competition; and third, power genera-
tion is responsible for approximately on third of greenhouse gas emissions in
developed economies.
A firm is taken to be active in power generation if it controls generation
assets through either direct ownership or the ownership of shares in other
generators. Shareholdings were recorded is as follows: imagine an industry
containing two independently owned firms, firms A and B, with capacities
of 100 MW and 50 MW respectively in period one. In period two firm A
acquires a 50% shareholding in firm B. This transaction would be recorded
on the matrix by firm A’s period two share increasing to 125 MW and firm
B’s falling to 25 MW. Patterns of cross shareholdings in this industry are
extremely complex, so it is inevitable that some have been missed. Capacity
for self-generation by, for example large aluminium plants is excluded.
The organizational forms of firms in the industry are many and varied.
For example many firms are diversified either horizontally - they are multi-
national in their power generation activities, or vertically - upwards into
gas, for example, or downwards into wires businesses or supply. Indeed for
some, power generation may be a minority activity in terms of revenue or
sales. Since sole focus of this thesis is power generation, all other activities
are excluded, which is not to deny their importance but rather to shine the
spotlight on generation.
Member states
This is a comprehensive data set covering the EU plus Norway, which is a
pivotal player in Northern Europe. The only countries excluded from the
sample were Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta whose combined capacity in
2007 amounted to less than 0.5% of total EU installed capacity.
Leading firms
As explained above, the matrix focusses only on ‘leading firms’. There are
many possible definitions of what a leading firm is, and at first sight there
was no clear rule to choose between them. The Sector Inquiry presents shares
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of available capacity for each undertaking3 in selected member states in 2004
(EC, 2006, pp. 336-339). Examination of these graphs was helpful with the
formation a definition of what constitutes a leading firm4. For 11 of the 13
countries for which data was presented in the Sector Inquiry, the share of
available capacity of the largest two firms was in excess of 50%, and for 8
of the countries, over 65%. On the other hand, the country with the largest
number of moderately sized generators was the UK, where the largest five
firms accounting for 66% of available capacity. Since the interest lies in the
activity of the largest firms it was therefore decided to set the threshold at
five, therefore:
A leading firm is defined to be one the five largest gen-
erators in at least one Member State.
Whilst the setting of this threshold was inevitably somewhat arbitrary,
this approach has several advantages: it can be expected that in theory, all
leading players will be captured; the coverage of the sample firms is likely
to be high relative to the combined system size of all member states5, and
by eliminating the smallest players, some control was exercised over the size
of the database, which is a non-trivial benefit given the limited resources
available and the magnitude of the data collection exercise.
2.5 Data collection process
Having defined the selection criteria, the data collection process could be
started. The vast majority of the data required was firm level, and this part
3Undertakings were unidentified in the Sector Inquiry, but their identities could gen-
erally be established by virtue of informed guesswork and cross-checking with the matrix
data.
4While available capacity may be the same if the firm has for example, no mothballed
plant, in the presence of capacity unavailable for whatever reason, available capacity will
always be less than installed capacity, and thus underestimate the extent of control of
capacity in the long run.
5The concept of system size will occur throughout the thesis. For the purposes of this
study, system size is defined as the total net electrical capacity of all power plants in a
given member state, as reported by Eurostat.
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of the process consisted of four steps. First, the set of potential candidate
firms that were among the five largest in their member state of origin in 2004
was identified in the following way; for each member state, candidate firms
were extracted from the Materials and Energy Yearbook (Meller, 2008) and
from the O¨ko-Instiut’s study (Matthes et al., 2007) discussed in section 2.3.
Repeating this process for each of the 25 sample member states, produced a
list of 61 sample leading firms 6.
The second step was to extract each firm’s installed capacity in their
domestic market, and to rank firms originating in each member state in
reverse size order. This revealed that, for example, in 2004 there were 9
potential leading firms in the UK. In total, 54 firms qualified for inclusion
in the database i.e. they were among the largest 5 in their member state of
origin, as explained above.
The third step was to extract each firm’s installed capacity in each of
the 25 member states, by examination of the annual reports of each of the
54 sample firms for each of the 10 sample years. The scale of the data
collection exercise may be understood by considering that each firm was
potentially active in 25 member states, therefore for each sample year, it was
necessary to check the capacity of each firm in each member state, which
amounted to 1,325 observations. The resultant database therefore contains
13,250 observations.
Step three was complicated by two factors; the absence of a common
reporting format, and the absence of annual reports for the earlier years of
the sample. Concerning the second, over the sample period it has become the
convention for firms to post annual reports on company websites, which made
collecting the data for the later years relatively straightforward. However
6This is significantly less than the theoretical maximum number of leading firms which
is 125 (5 firms in each of 25 member states). The diﬀerence between the theoretical
maximum and the actual number is explained by the fact that many countries did not
have five generators. More than a quarter of the member states analyzed in the Sector
Inquiry and discussed in the section above had fewer than five generators. Countries
that acceded to the EU later include a majority of Eastern European countries where the
norm was for an incumbent monopolist. The mean proportion of firms with (significantly)
fewer than five generators is therefore likely to be higher for a sample that includes such
countries.
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where reports were missing from websites, they had to be acquired by making
requests directly to the firms concerned. The lack of a common reporting
format, and the related issue that the reporting format for any given firm
typically changes over time, meant that close analysis of each report was
required.
The production of a comprehensive, strongly balanced panel of data was
achieved as the result of this data collection process which was conducted
over a period of well over a year, though the degree of intensity varied over
the period. The full list of sample firms and their basic characteristics is
presented in 2.4 in the Appendix to this chapter.
In order to analyze member state level eﬀects, total installed capacity
(system size) for each member state was gathered directly from Eurostat.
Finally, a note on the sample period. The data covers the period 1998
– 2007. The liberalization agenda pursued by the EC got underway in 1997
when the First Electricity Directive (EC, 1996) came into force7 and the
sample period was chosen to capture industry dynamics in the context of
sectoral reform.
2.6 The power generation matrix
The matrix contains the generation capacities of 54 firms leading firms (as
defined above) for each year in the period 1998 – 2007, disaggregated over 25
member states. The magnitude of the necessary data gathering exercise may
be appreciated by noting that Davies and Lyons (1996) matrix consisted of
data on 313 firms in 11 member states for a single year, and Clarke (2002)
on 56 and 61 firms in 14 member states for two separate years. The power
generation matrix that was created is large. The long form has 13,250 rows
(54 firms in 25 countries over 10 years) and there are associated with it and
additional set of matrices, one for each of the seven regions (see section 2.8).
The wide form has 540 rows and 25 columns. It is therefore not feasible to
visually reproduce either version of the matrix here.
7Though some member states, notably the Nordic countries and the UK, had already
begun the process of reforming their electricity sectors.
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Table 2.1 reports data on the broad dimensions of the matrix in 1998 and
2007, based on which a number of remarks can be made about the changing
structure of the power sector in the EU.
1. Of the 54 matrix firms that were leading in their home member state
in 2004, 51 were active in 1998, implying that 3 firms entered the
market between 1998 and 2004. This appears to be a modest level of
entry given the objective of the reforms to induce entry, however it is
consistent with an industry in which barriers to entry are high.
2. By the end of the sample period, 48 firms were active in the sector,
which means that 6 firms exited the industry in the interim.
3. The extent of firm multinationality can be estimated by the extent to
which they are geographically diversified – that is to say the number
of member states in which the own capacity. Given the structure of
the matrix, horizontal diversification can be calculated by dividing the
number of non-zero values for installed capacity by the number of active
firms. By this calculation the average number of countries in which
active firms owned capacity increased from 1.3 to 2.2 over the period8.
4. Finally, the proportion of the total aggregate system size covered by the
sample firms rose from 75% to 77%. The remaining capacity was owned
by firms that were not leading firms. While many countries have a
monopoly generator, others for example Austria and more importantly,
Germany and the UK have fragmented generation sectors.
8A detailed study of firm multinationality may be found in chapter 4.
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1998 2007
Countries 25 25
Number active firms 51 48
Non-zero Sik 68 107
Mean number member states 1·3 2·2
Coverage of system(%) 74·6 76·7
Sik is the capacity in GW of firm i in country k
Table 2.1: Scope of the matrix. 1998 and 2007
Table 2.2 presents a small section taken from the market share matrix for
illustrative purposes. Each entry is the capacity S of firm i in country k in
year t. To illustrate, consider the row covering Eon’s capacities. Eon owns
capacity in five of the six example countries in this fragment, the size of their
generation capacity in each is given and the last column shows that their
total size in 2007 was 51.5 GW. It is important to note that this number
represents an estimate of Eon’s capacity in the EU only, so excludes for
example, capacity owned in the USA.
Now looking down the column headed ES (Spain), it is clear that in 2007
EDP, Endesa, Enel and Eon own capacity in Spain, and that the total capac-
ity of matrix firms for Spain was 56.4 GW (penultimate entry in column). A
measure of the proportion of the total installed capacity of any sample coun-
try covered by matrix firms may be calculated by dividing the penultimate
row, which summarizes matrix firm capacity, by the last row which contains
Eurostat’s estimates of total system size in each country.
For three countries shown in the table, Denmark, Estonia and Finland,
the Eurostat data suggest the total system size to be smaller than that result-
ing from our calculations, though not substantially. In the case of Estonia
(EE), this is due to rounding. For Denmark (DK) and Finland (FL), in-
stalled capacity data is not routinely reported in annual reports. Rather in
the Nordic markets the convention appears to be to report firm size in terms
of production (TWh). Thus a variety of third party sources had to be relied
upon, which may have resulted in some inaccuracy. However cross checking
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with production data suggests the data to be approximately correct. One
final issue concerns the accuracy of the Eurostat data given in the bottom
row of the table. Eurostat aims for accuracy, but acknowledge that there
is a balance to be struck between timely publication of data and accuracy
(Eurostat, 2004).
Comparison of the last two rows of table 2.2 shows that, for example
in Germany (DE), the matrix firms cover 68% of total system size in 2007.
On average the coverage by matrix firms of the total system capacity as
reported by Eurostat is around 73%, so even restricting the analysis (and
data gathering exercise) to 54 firms a high proportion of the actual installed
capacity is captured.
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Capacity (GW) in country k
Firm Origin DE DK EE ES FI FR Total
. . .
EDF FR 7 98 123
Edison IT 0
EDP PT 3·9 12·5
EE2 DK 0
Eles Gen SL 2·5
Elsam DK 0
Endesa ES
Enel IT 21·7 69
Eni IT 3·3
Eon DE 26·2 0·03 2·8 0·03 2·49 51·5
. . .
Total Matrix 82·6 12·9 2·4 56·4 15·0 10·0 576
Total EU 122 12·4 2·3 82·1 14·3 109·4 750
Sources: Company annual reports; EU capacities from Eurostat (2005, 2008)
Cells are populated by Sikt; firm i’s capacity in GW in country k in year t
Country codes are given in the Appendix
Table 2.2: Fragment of the market share matrix. 2007
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In order to develop a fuller picture of the database, summary statistics for
key variables are presented in the Appendix, as is a table listing all sample
firms and summarising their key features.
2.7 Coverage by country of origin
Table 2.3 reports the proportion of the total matrix capacity covered by
firms from particular member states in 1998 and 2007 for the six countries
with the largest shares. It shows that in 1998 there were three firms on
the matrix that originated in France (EDF, GDF and Suez), and that their
combined share of the capacity of all matrix firms that year was 30.8%, while
France accounted for only 16.2% of the total size of the EU system. The fact
that the French share of the French matrix firms is about twice as large as
France’s share of the total EU system, reflects the very large non-domestic
generation assets of Suez. In the UK the situation is reversed, which suggests
the ownership of assets by non-matrix firms based in the EU or firms from
non-matrix countries, e.g. the USA. In fact ownership of capacity in the
EU by firms from non-matrix countries is negligible, so the majority of the
diﬀerence is accounted for by non-matrix firms, which is an indication of a
fragmented generation sector. Further, matrix firms based in Germany (DE)
accounted for only 8.7% of matrix capacity in 1998, but by 2007 controlled
16.5% of matrix capacity.
These results are interesting because they identify the strongest member
states and changes in their relative positions, but they should be interpreted
with caution since the generation capacity in a country reflects the size of
its population and GDP, so it is to be expected that relatively large and rich
countries enter the ranks of the largest six in the sample.
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Origin Number of firms Share matrix capacity Country share system
1998
FR 3 30.8 16.2
IT 5 15.6 9.6
ES 3 9.0 7.2
DE 2 8.7 15.7
UK 3 4.0 10.8
SE 1 3.9 5.1
Total 17 71.9 64.8
2007
FR 3 23.3 14.6
DE 2 16.5 16.3
IT 4 16.5 11.3
UK 4 5.9 10.0
SE 1 6.2 4.4
ES 3 5.8 10.9
Total 17 71.9 67.4
Table 2.3: Matrix share of capacity, by member state of origin. 1998 and
2007
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2.8 Concentration in power generation
The matrix is flexible enough to support data analysis at any level between
the firm and the EU. In this section concentration at the EU and regional
levels is reported. It is worth restating that a principal objective of the thesis
is to provide an analysis of the (hypothetical) EU single internal market in
electricity.
2.8.1 Concentration at the EU level
The matrix reveals that by 2007, just three firms owned 36% of total EU
capacity. The sheer scale of the largest firms is remarkable. To get a slightly
diﬀerent perspective on aggregate concentration at the EU level, the Herfind-
ahl Hirschman Index (HHI) was calculated and is shown in figure 2.1. While
there have been periods of decline and increase, the overall trend of the line
is upward. This finding and its implications will be investigated in depth in
chapter 3.
Figure 2.1: HHI, aggregate EU. 1998–2007
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2.8.2 Concentration at the regional level
The slow progress towards meeting the EC’s single market ambitions (e.g.
Smeers, 2009) lead to frustration in many quarters and in early 2006 Energy
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) and the Council of Euro-
pean Energy Regulators (CEER) launched a Regional Initiatives (RI) plan9.
The idea was to create 7 regional markets for electricity in which neighbour-
ing member states could work together to tackle barriers to competition and
trade, such as balancing arrangements and the lack of transparency. The
RI can be thought of as a set of interim goals on the pathway to a single
electricity market.
The Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration for each of the
seven RIs was calculated. The participants in the RIs are given in the Ap-
pendix and HHIs are presented in figure 2.2. The first thing to notice concerns
the levels of concentration. For only two regions, Central East and Northern,
is the value of the HHI below 0.1 the threshold below which all competition
authorities in the EU regard as unconcentrated. One region, Central South,
falls into the moderately concentrated category (HHI< 0.18) while the HHI
for South West, Baltic, Central West and the UK, France and Ireland take
values above 0.18 that place them in the highly concentrated category.
The second noticeable feature are the trends in the HHIs; the most dra-
matic is the sharp downward movement of the HHI in the South West region,
which is largely the result of entry into the Spanish market by firms based
outside the South West region. The Baltic region shows a sharp increase
from 2004 to 2005, the result of capacity being withdrawn from the market.
Central West, Central East, the UK, France and Ireland, and Central South
all exhibit modest declines, while Northern exhibits a modest increase.
Two things should be emphasized at this point. First, caution should be
exercised when comparing figures 2.1 and 2.2 because the scale of the verti-
cal axes is diﬀerent. There is considerable variation between regional HHIs.
The second point to note is that the decision to focus only on power genera-
9It is interesting to note that while the EC supported the RI, they were not the initiating
party.
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Figure 2.2: HHI, regions. 1998–2007
tion means that these estimates of concentration will underestimate the true
level of concentration that would be observed if firms’ up and downstream
activities were taken into account.
It would be interesting to compare these results with the O¨ko Institut
(Matthes et al., 2007) study of concentration in power production discussed
in section 2.3, however meaningful comparisons cannot be readily made since
the research on which the the O¨ko Institut study is based pre-dated the
ERGEG RI, and regions were defined in a diﬀerent way. However the O¨ko
Institut findings for ‘Scandinavia’ appear to be broadly consistent with our
estimate for the Northern region. Considering southern Europe, while the
trend for their ‘Portugal and Spain’ is downwards it is not as steep as our
estimate for the South West region (which includes France), however there
is a substantial diﬀerence in the levels of concentration, no doubt influenced
by the presence of France in the RI South West region.
Aggregating member states into regions in this way clearly provides more
detail than examination of the EU as a whole; at the level of the RIs the
picture becomes much more varied. This may suggest a preference for anal-
ysis at the member state rather than RI level which necessarily results in
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the loss of some detail compared to analysis at the individual member state
level. For example, the UK, France and Ireland region is dominated in size
by France which has a system size of more than twice the combined size of
the other participants, and in both France and Ireland one firm enjoys single
dominance. However, since the underlying objective of the thesis to expose
the structure of the sector in a way that is consistent with the goals and
objectives of EU energy policy, and given the requirement to place limits
on the size of the project, it seems to be legitimate to conduct the analysis
at both the EU and regional level and leave member state level analysis for
future research.
2.9 Conclusion
The market share matrix of power generation is the structure on which most
of the empirical analysis in the thesis is based. In this chapter the outline of
this unique panel data set has been presented. Specifically, the wide form of
the matrix can be used to provide the following information for each year:
• Along the rows, the extent of each firm’s horizontal diversification
across the sample countries and their total capacity in the sample mem-
ber states.
• Down the columns, the structure of the market in each sample country
– the number and size distribution of market participants and their
identities, and the coverage of the total installed capacity in each coun-
try by matrix firms.
The regional sub-matrices can be analyzed to reveal the same information
by region.
The coverage of the matrix is high, accounting for 73% of EU installed
capacity in 2007, so the sample data is representative of the sector as a whole,
and despite the focus on the largest power generators, not much detail has
been lost. On the downside, cross ownership of assets is pervasive and some
have certainly been omitted. Nevertheless, the major shareholdings have
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been captured and recall that the objective is to provide a high level overview
of changes in the structure of the industry bearing in mind the high degree
of politicization in the sector.
The matrix is a flexible and powerful tool for the analysis of structural
changes in EU power generation. Among other insights, it has already been
established that firms are increasingly multinational and that the concentra-
tion picture varies considerably between the ERGEG regions, and appears
to be high in at least some locations.
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Matrix firms in 2007
Rank Firm Origin Size (GW) MNAT
1 EDF FR 123·40 7
2 ENEL IT 68·67 6
3 EON DE 51·53 10
4 RWE DE 43·52 3
5 VATTENFALL SE 35·94 5
6 IBEDROLA ES 29·47 4
7 CEZ CZ 16·49 3
8 STATKRAFT NO 12·87 3
9 EDP PT 12·50 2
10 BRITISH ENERGY UK 11·74 1
11 FORTUM FL 10·81 3
12 SSE UK 10·50 1
13 DEI GR 10·26 1
14 PGE PL 10·00 1
15 DONG DK 9·95 1
16 AEM IT 9·08 1
17 SUEZ FR 8·82 7
18 VERBUND AT 8·78 2
19 INTERNATIONAL POWER UK 7·11 8
20 SC HIDROELECTRICA RO 6·00 1
21 ESB IE 5·84 1
22 ESSENT NL 5·51 2
23 PKE PL 5·00 1
24 CENTRICA UK 4·57 2
25 NUON NL 4·00 1
26 ACCIONA ES 3·68 6
27 SC NUCLEARELECTRICA RO 3·5 1
Continued on the next page
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Rank Firm Origin Size (GW) MNAT
28 PVO FL 3·50 1
29 ENI IT 3·30 1
30 INPP LT 3·00 1
31 SC ELECTROCENTRALE RO 2·81 1
32 E-CO VANNKRAFT NO 2·75 1
33 KOZLODUY BG 2·72 1
34 NEK BG 2·57 1
35 MVM HU 2·50 1
36 ELES GEN SL 2·50 1
37 E ENERGIA EE 2·37 1
38 SLOVENSKE ELECTRARNE SK 2·31 1
39 CE TURCENI RO 2·06 1
40 JSC LATVENERGO LV 2·05 1
41 GDF FR 1·97 3
42 TEPLAREN KOSICE SK 1·65 1
43 WIENENERGI AT 1·62 1
44 EVN AT 1·60 1
45 SC TERMOELECTRICA RO 1·50 1
46 TIWAG AT 1·39 1
47 NEWAG AT 1·35 1
48 SPE BE 0·60 1
49 ENDESA ES 0·00 0
49 EDISON IT 0·00 0
49 SCOTTISH POWER UK 0·00 0
49 EE2 DK 0·00 0
49 ASM IT 0·00 0
49 ELSAM DK 0·00 0
MNAT denotes the number of member states in which the firm owns capacity
Firms ranked 40 had become inactive by 2007
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2.10.2 Summary statistics of key variables
Variable Mean Std·Dev. Min Max Observations
sizefirm overall 13·58 20·33 0 123·40 N= 390
between 20·08 1·90 113·35 n= 39
within 4·41 −13·33 36·02 T= 10
sharesys overall 0·02 0·03 0 0·18 N= 390
between 0·03 0·00 0·18 n= 39
within 0·01 −0·02 0·05 T= 10
originsize overall 52·78 36·07 4·26 121·76 N= 390
between 36·16 5·38 112·40 n= 39
within 4·89 36·49 72·93 T= 10
cr3 overall 0·32 0·01 0·31 0·36 N= 390
between 0 0·32 0·32 n= 39
within 0·01 0·31 0·36 T= 10
sizefirm is firm size in GW
sharesys is firm share of total system size (%)
originsize is the size of the firm’s member state of origin in GW
cr3 is the 3 firm concentration ratio in the member state of origin
N denotes total number of individual-time observations
n denotes the number of individual firms
T denotes the number of time periods
Table 2.5: Summary statistics, key variables
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2.10.3 EU country codes
AT Austria IT Italy
BE Belgium LT Lithuania
BG Bulgaria LV Latvia
CZ Czech Republic NL Netherlands
DE Germany NO Norway
DK Denmark PL Poland
EE Estonia PT Portugal
ES Spain RO Romania
FL Finland SE Sweden
FR France SK Slovakia
GR Greece SL Slovenia
HU Hungary UK United Kingdom
IE Ireland
Table 2.6: EU Country codes
2.10.4 ERGEG Regions
Region Members
Baltic EE, LT, LV
Central East AT, CZ, DE, HU, PL, SK, SL
Central West BE, DE, FR, NL
Central South AT, DE, FR, GR, IT, SL
Northern DE, DK, FL, NO, PL, SE
South West ES, FR, PT
Source: ERGEG
http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EERHOME/EERINITIATIV ES
accessed23July2010.
Table 2.7: ERGEG regional initiatives
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CHAPTER
THREE
MERGERS AND THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF
FIRMS AT THE AGGREGATE EU LEVEL
3.1 Introduction
Edith Penrose observed that many of the challenges faced by industrial
economists with respect to economic policy, would fall away if firms grew
roughly in proportion to the rate of growth in the industry (Penrose, 1959,
p.198), and that “competition is at once the god and the devil” (ibid., p.265)
since it may lead to eﬃcient firm growth but also to an industrial structure
in which growth is dampened. The tension arises because competition pro-
vides firms with the motivation to improve eﬃciency and to innovate and
expand, as well as the motivation to restrict competition in order to protect
themselves against rivals. To put it another way, it is diﬃcult to ascertain
whether or not the dominance of an industry by a few large firms is the re-
sult of their superior eﬃciency, in which case consumers may expect welfare
gains (assuming the eﬃciencies are passed on), or as a result of restrictions
on competition.
Large corporations emerged at an increasing rate over the twentieth and
early twenty first centuries, and concern about their social, political and
economic power has been widespread and enduring; as long ago as 1887 the
pricing of railroads in the USA was regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act
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(White, 2002). This study is motivated by similar concerns. The problem
identified by Penrose and which will be explored here can be mapped directly
into the concept of aggregate concentration, or the ability of large firms
to influence industrial structure, which increases as a consequence of the
intensification of control of industrial assets, and therefore of output, sales
and employment (Hannah and Kay, 1977, Clarke and Davies, 1983, p.41).
Aggregate concentration matters in the present context because in order to
evaluate progress towards the single market, it is important to know not only
the structure of the sector today, but also the ways in which the sector has
developed since the start of the liberalization process.
The key objectives of the chapter are (i) to trace out the changing struc-
ture of the industry post liberalization (ii) to investigate the direct causes of
those changes (iii) to evaluate the role played by mergers, and (iv) tease out
the policy implications.
The chapter proceeds as follows. To provide some context, the process
of liberalization in EU power markets is outlined briefly in the next section,
before the sample is described and basic data presented in section 3.3. Sec-
tion 3.4 evaluates changes in aggregate concentration and section 3.5 relates
the growth of firms to these observed changes. The contribution of mergers
is assessed in section 3.7 and the implications of the study are discussed in
the final section.
3.2 The liberalization of electricity markets
in the European Union
The modern state, particularly as it developed following the Second World
War, embraced the provision of essential services, for example, health care,
education, prisons and utilites, in part because the values underlying modern
states held their provision to be incompatible with the profit motive. State
control and regulation became the norm. The intellectual shift that has taken
place over the last thirty years reversed that trend, and as a consequence we
have witnessed the transfer of responsibility for essential services away from
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the state and towards private firms.
The Single European Act of 1986 signaled the European Union’s (EU)
intention to pursue with renewed vigour its ambition to create a single in-
ternal market in which there is free movement of goods, people, services and
capital. The ensuing legislative programme reflects the simultaneous with-
drawl of the state and ascendency of the market in the supply of essential
services. Legislative reform in the electric power sector was set in train by
the First Electricity Directive in 1996 (Directive 96/92/EC) and embodied
the belief that markets discipline participants.
Liberalization of a formerly monopolized sector may involve one or both
of the following dimensions. First functional unbundling of the diﬀerent seg-
ments in the production chain1 and the introduction of competition where it
is feasible, typically increasing the number of firms either through new entry
or by splitting up the monopolist. The expectation of an inverse relationship
between firm numbers and the intensity of competition is implicit. The sec-
ond possibility is privatization, which results in the transfer of assets from
state to private ownership. But the utility may already be in private owner-
ship, or the state may not wish to relinquish its ownership, so privatization
is not an essential step in the liberalization process.
In the case of utilities, privatization alone may be benign with respect
to the structure of the industry since the ‘control’ element can be achieved
through regulation, which is typically not sensitive to the ownership regime.
On the other hand, liberalization, which subjects utilities to the discipline of
the market, is likely to have important consequences for the industry struc-
ture. Indeed Newbery (2002, p.386) argues that the full benefits of privatiz-
ing former network monopolies are realized only when eﬀective competition
is established in the potentially competitive segments2. Importantly though,
privatization presents opportunities for mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and
of course this exerts capital market discipline even on monopolists. It will
be shown that mergers drove firm growth and had a significant eﬀect on
1For electricity, that is, generation, high voltage transmission, distribution and supply
(or retail).
2Though the networks themselves remain natural monopolies.
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aggregate concentration in the sector.
The introduction of eﬀective competition in power generation has proved
particularly challenging, and the progress towards a single internal market
in power (and gas) has required an ongoing and increasingly sophisticated
legislative programme and intervention by the EC’s Directorate General for
Competition (DG Competition). Nevertheless, the operating environment
facing power generators has changed radically since the late 1990s, and they
have adapted their corporate strategies accordingly. Firms have become
larger, integrated both up and downstream, and are increasingly multina-
tional.
3.3 Data
Detecting and explaining changes in aggregate concentration implies a focus
on the largest firms in the sector because they have the largest impact on
changes in concentration. In this section the sample firms and member states
are described, the sample selection and data collection processes outlined and
some preliminary analysis presented.
3.3.1 The sample firms
This study is concerned only with firms that own power generation assets.
Power generators have diverse business models which include a range of orga-
nizational forms, and in some cases the scope of their operations has changed
radically over the period; some have integrated vertically into inputs, for ex-
ample the highly controversial merger of Eon and Ruhrgas in 2002 which
brought a very substantial pan-European gas business into the Eon fold.
While important, such changes in scope and their impact on the overall size
of the firm are outside the remit of this work. References to ‘the industry’
and ‘sector’ therefore refer only to power generation.
Firm size is measured by installed capacity in gigawatts (GW), because
changes over time in a firm’s capacity act as a record of their strategic deci-
sions conditional on a set of beliefs about the likely evolution of the industry
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and their place in that industry. More usual measures of firm size, for exam-
ple, sales, revenue or production, necessarily reflect short-run market supply
and demand conditions from which this study seeks to abstract. As Nilsson
(2005) argues, if the issue of interest are long run changes, then capacity is
the appropriate measure of size.
3.3.2 Sample selection
54 candidate firms were identified from the market share matrix introduced
in chapter 2. Preliminary examination of distribution of matrix firms’ size
was highly positively skewed, reflecting the large number of small firms. The
selection criterion for inclusion in the matrix was that a firm must be one of
the largest five firms in at least one member state (which in fact was always
their country of origin) but the large number of small countries included in the
matrix meant that some matrix firms were, nevertheless, small. Because the
focus on the largest firms, the analysis presented in this chapter is restricted
to data on firms that were at some point, among the largest 30 generating
firms in the EU and that originated in one of the 18 sample member states
discussed above. The distribution was truncated so that only firms that were,
in at least one year, among the largest 30 firms, were included. This resulted
in a sample of 39 firms.
This approach to sample selection means that it is likely that the vast
majority of large firms have been captured, though it is probable that a small
number of generators at the lower end of the ‘large firm distribution’ have
been omitted. There is no comprehensive, reliable and freely available list-
ing of all generators based in the EU against which the database could be
checked, and resource constraints prevented further data gathering. Never-
theless, it is shown in figure 3.1 that the sample covers approximately 80%
of total capacity.
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3.3.3 The sample member states
The sample firms originate in 18 countries3 (17 EU–27 countries plus Nor-
way), and the size of the generation assets of the ith firm in country k is
denoted sik. The system size of each member state is therefore given by
Sk =
￿
sik, and the total system size4 of all member states calculated given
by summing S over the 18 sample member states. Eurostat publish installed
capacity equivalent to Sk for each member state, from which the total system
size was calculated.
The top line in figure 3.1 shows that the total system size rose from 583
GW in 1998 to 703 GW in 20075, so over the ten year period, the total
capacity, or system size, of all sample member states expanded by around
20%. This is consistent with consumption growth recorded by the European
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity6,7 (ENTSOE)
(UCTE, 2008, p.133).
3.3.4 Data collection and sources
Firm size
Data on the size of the sample firms for the period 1998 – 2007 were collected
primarily from company annual reports which are in general available on
their websites. Where this was not the case, the data were obtained either
through direct communication with the firm concerned, or very occasionally,
through other publicly available sources. The data includes shareholdings
where possible. For example, in 2007 EdF had a shareholding of 45% in
EnBW, so EdF’s total capacity in 2007 includes 45% of EnBW’s capacity.
Firm size was calculated in the following way. For each firm, annual
3Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, UK.
4For the purposes of this study, system size is defined as the total net electrical capacity
of all power plants in a given member state, as reported by Eurostat
5Because the data used is the aggregate of total system size for each sample member
state rather than the EU total installed capacity, this measure is robust to changes in the
size of the EU; in 2004 and 2007 two member states in this sample joined the EU.
6formerly UCTE
7Demand rose from 2,172 TWh in 1998 to 2,607TWh in 2007
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reports were obtained and from them, the firm’s capacity in each of the
sample countries (if any) was extracted. These data were then summed to
yield a measure of aggregate firm size which represents the total firm capacity
in the 18 sample member states. This is not necessarily the same as the
firm size in the EU or globally, though of course it may be. For example,
the aggregate capacity of a firm active in only two member states both of
which are included in the sample, will be the same irrespective of whether
it is aggregated over the full EU 27 or just the sample member states. This
exercise resulted in a unique panel of data on 39 of the largest firms spanning
10 years and which could be decomposed by country. To give an idea of the
sizes of the very largest firms, the capacities of firms that ranked 1–10 in any
given year are presented in table 3.1.
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Firm installed capacity in 18 member states (GW)
Firm Origin 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EDF France 102.1 102.1 105.5 110.6 112.4 114.6 115.0 121.8 122.8 123.4
Enel Italy 57.0 56.0 56.0 44.8 44.8 45.3 45.3 50 48.9 68.7
Eon Germany 10.9 11.2 29.0 40.8 45.1 44.7 44.4 45.6 46.1 60.25
RWE Germany 30.2 30.2 35.1 35.1 43.7 43.5 43.0 42.9 43.2 43.5
Vattenfall Sweden 18.2 18.2 19.1 19.1 30.7 33.9 33.3 35.2 35.9 35.9
Suez France 1.5 22.2 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.8 26.8 27.7 30.5 31.3
Ibedrola Spain 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.6 19.3 21.2 23.2 24.5 26.8 28.7
Cez Czech Rep. 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 16.5 16.5
EDP Portugal 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 10.8 10.5 11.0 12.0 12 13.3
Statkraft Norway 11.5 11.5 11.6 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.1 13.1
Endesa Spain 23.8 23.4 23.4 27.5 28.0 27.1 30.3 31.0 34.19 .
Edison Italy 9.5 9.5 9.5 7.6 14.8 14.8 14.8 0 . .
BE UK 9.8 9.8 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Veba Germany 17.8 17.8 . . . . . . . .
NP/Innogy UK 12.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 . . . . . .
Source: Company annual reports, own calculations.
A firm that ceased to exist as an independent entity is denoted (.).
Firms that were at some point in the sample period, one of the largest 10 firms.
Table 3.1: Aggregate capacity of the very largest firms. 1998–2007.
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Certain stylized facts about the changing structure of power generation in
the EU can be drawn from table 3.1. First, there is one dominant firm that is
larger than the combined size of the second and third firms in all years except
the final year, when the ratio fell slightly. Second, the capacities of firms that
exit are to a large extent, bought by other top ten firms and third, that the
exiting firms had assets over 14.8 GW - that is to say, they were fairly large,
even in this sample of large firms. These points will be investigated further
below.
Merger data
To investigate the contribution of mergers to the increase in aggregate con-
centration, data on mergers was collected. The primary source of the merger
data was a survey of M&A deals in EU power and gas between 1998 and 2007
(Le´veˆque, 2008). Where necessary other sources, for example company an-
nual reports, coverage in the specialist press and the European Commission’s
merger database were consulted to augment the data.
3.3.5 Coverage of the sample
The sample firms’ total capacity in the 18 member states grew from 451 GW
to 584 GW over the period. Figure 3.1 shows the gap between the sample
firms and the sample member states narrows slightly, and despite including
only the largest 39 firms, the coverage of the sample is around 83% in 2007.
Because the growth of the largest firms (by definition, the sample firms)
was larger than growth in the total system size, the proportion of the total
system accounted for by small firms excluded from the sample fell from 23%
to 17% over the period: large firms controlled an increasing proportion of
total capacity.
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Figure 3.1: Coverage of the sample firms
3.4 Firm size and aggregate concentration
In this section data on the size distribution of sample firms at the start and
end of the period are presented, and changes in firm size and thus aggregate
concentration are traced out and discussed.
3.4.1 The firm size distribution
The mean size of firms increased from approximately 11.5 GW to 15 GW
between 1998 and 2007. Kernel density distributions for 1998 and 2007 for
the data described above were estimated and are shown in figure 3.28.
The kernel density estimate is bimodal, which is very interesting if un-
expected. It suggests that the vast majority of the growth comes from the
very largest firms which is not borne out by analysis later in this section or
in table ??. Two possible explanations rest on the shape of the underlying
8Kernel density estimation imposes no specific structure on the data and has two other
advantages over histograms. First, it generates a smooth, not a step function, which is the
result of connecting the midpoints of the histogram. Second, it assigns higher weights to
data points closer to the evaluation point rather than the equal weight assigned to every
entry in a histogram bin.
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Figure 3.2: Kernel density estimate
population distribution. Kernel density estimation is based on the assump-
tion that it is approximately log normal, and in accordance with the majority
of the literature (e.g. Chesher, 1979) we have made this assumption. If the
population is indeed log normal then the observed pattern may be an arte-
fact of the particular sample that we have, i.e. the 39 largest firms, and may
indicate the omission of a small number of largish firms.
An alternative and much more interesting explanation is the possibil-
ity that the underlying distribution is not log-normal throughout its whole
range. Simon and Bonini (1958) show that if firms grow approximately in
proportion to their size (the law of proportionate eﬀect, see section ??) and
assuming that firms above some minimum size have constant costs, then the
distribution of firms above the minimum size, i.e. those with constant costs,
follows a Yule distribution. To put the same point another way, imagine
splitting the existing sample into two parts, one sub-sample consisting of the
firms with variable costs might be distributed log normally, while distribu-
tion of the firms with constant costs follows the Yule. The implications of
this point are explored further in section 3.8.
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3.4.2 Aggregate concentration and its measurement
Aggregate concentration has been defined as the degree of control over eco-
nomic activity in the macro economy or at the sectoral level, that is held
by the largest firms (Hannah and Kay, 1977, p.41). It is generally diﬀer-
entiated from market concentration, or the dominance of distinct markets
by the largest firms operating in that market, though (Clarke and Davies,
1983) show aggregate concentration to be proportionate to a weighted sum
of market concentration so the two concepts are formally linked. Recall that
in chapter 1 we explained the intention to concentrate on the EC’s single
market vision. Accordingly in this study, aggregate concentration is defined
as the extent of the influence over EU power generation exercised by the
firms with the largest capacities, assuming that the EU is a single market.
No comprehensive study of aggregate concentration in EU power markets
could be found in the peer-reviewed literature, and as discussed in section 3.2
the Sector Inquiry did not discuss the concept. A small number of studies fall
somewhere in between; Domanico (2007) discusses the relationship between
aggregate EU concentration and market concentration in selected member
states in a multi-market contact framework, and Green (2006) takes a similar
approach, highlighting the role of mergers.
For the purposes of this study, three diﬀerent measures of aggregate con-
centration are calculated, each of which reveal a slightly diﬀerent insight
into the data9. A consequence of the absence of literature on aggregate
concentration is a lack of consensus concerning the level of aggregate con-
centration at which concerns may be raised legitimately. While thresholds
for various measures of market concentration are embodied in for example,
the EC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines (EC, 2004), or the guidelines of in-
dividual competition authorities such as the German Bundeskartellampt, no
such benchmarks exist with respect to aggregate concentration. To assist in
evaluating our results, the quantitative estimates of aggregate concentration
for this sample are evaluated with respect to those found in earlier studies of
9For a survey discussing the measurement of concentration, see Curry and George
(1983).
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other sectors. Furthermore, since the study is an attempt to evaluate firms’
long run response to the changing competitive landscape, and thus implic-
itly to the policy framework, the trend in concentration is as important as its
absolute level. As White (2002) notes, knowledge of trends (in levels) is at
the very least, useful; a downward trend indicates that any problem related
to aggregate concentration is not getting worse.
Concentration ratios
The concentration ratio is an absolute measure of concentration denoted
CRn, and expressing the share of total capacity controlled by the largest n
firms. Despite or perhaps because of its simplicity, the CRn is widely em-
ployed as a measure of concentration in academic studies (see Schmalensee,
1989) and by practitioners. In terms of macroeconomic level aggregate con-
centration, 50, 100, 150 and 200 firm concentration ratios were calculated
and reported by White (2002), and the 5 firm concentration ratio in analysis
of food retailing in the EU (Dobson et al., 2001). For this sample, the 3,
5 and 10 firm concentration ratios in power generation are calculated, and
presented in figure 3.3.
Three features stand out. The CR3 was fairly stable at approximately
30% until 2006, after which it increased sharply. Second, the CR3 rose by
12.5% and both the CR5 and CR10 rose by approximately 15% in ten years.
Third, the gap between the CR5 and the CR10 widened until 2006, after
which its growth accelerated, mirroring the sharp rise in the CR3, which
suggests large changes in the size of one or more of the largest 3 firms. These
findings are evidence of an upward trend in concentration.
Comparison with estimates of concentration in other industries suggests
that aggregate concentration in EU power generation is high. Davies and
Lyons (1996) found an average CR5 of producer concentration for all manu-
facturing industries to be 26% and that the twenty largest firms in EU food
retailing accounted for 43% of turnover. Dobson et al. (2001) record a CR5
of over 40% for a very few sectors. Davies and Lyons (1996) find the mean
CR5 in EU manufacturing to be just 22.3%, less than half the mean CR5 in
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this sample in 2007.
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Figure 3.3: Three, five and ten firm concentration ratios
Gini coeﬃcient
An alternative way measuring aggregate concentration is in terms of shares
controlled by a given proportion of firms. It should be clear that aggregate
concentration concerns both the number of firms and the (size) inequalities
between them, and a useful tool for representing inequalities in distributions
is the Gini coeﬃcient. While more commonly applied to measures of income,
it is equally well suited to analysis of size inequalities between firms (e.g.
Hart and Prais, 1956).
The Gini coeﬃcient, represented graphically by the Lorenz curves shown
in figure 3.4, is the ratio of the area between the line of equality and the
Lorenz curve, to the total area under the 45% line. The higher the Gini
coeﬃcient the greater the inequality, so a Lorenz curve that lies on the 45%
line would have a Gini coeﬃcient of 0, which implies that all firms are of
equal size. By contrast, a Gini coeﬃcient of 10010 would imply that one firm
10The Gini coeﬃcient generally lies between 0 and 1, but in this case has been multiplied
by 100 to aid comparison with the CRn
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controls all capacity in the market.
Comparison of the coeﬃcients calculated for the start and end of the
period, 59.1, and 63.1 respectively, indicates that overall inequality has in-
creased. However examination of the curves plotted in figure 3.4 reveals more
detail about where in the size distribution the inequality has changed. For
example, it shows that the share of the total capacity controlled by 80% of
firms slipped from approximately 38% in 1998 to around 30% 2007, and that
while the share of the largest 7% of firms has remained broadly constant over
the period, that share was around 40% of capacity. Similarly, the share of
the smallest 20% of firms remained fairly constant. More generally, figure 3.4
presents evidence that inequality has increased among firms that occupy the
roughly the middle of the distribution. However, it is worth noting here that
the sample by definition comprises only the largest firms.
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Figure 3.4: Lorenz curves. 1998 and 2007
Herfindahl Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI) is used by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and all competition authorities in the EU to measure market
concentration during investigations into the potential abuse of market power
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and as a merger screen.
The HHI is also well suited to measuring aggregate concentration (Clarke
and Davies, 1983) and is calculated by summing the squared share11 of each
market participant, so if si is the capacity share of the ith firm of the industry
of size S, aggregate HHI is calculated according to the following formula:
HHI =
n￿
i=1
s2i /S
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Figure 3.5: HHI, aggregate concentration
Figure 3.5 shows the HHI rose from 0.052 to 0.061, or about 17% over the
period. The figure shows that the HHI took a sharp upward trend, though it
is not continuously trending upwards. Rather, it follows a jagged path which
may be an indicator of the associated large and sudden transfers of assets
perhaps induced by mergers. The striking rise in the HHI between 2000
and 2002 and again between 2006 and 2007 reflects significant size increases
among the very largest firms (see table 3.1). The decline in the HHI between
11More usually it is share of sales or revenue, but in this case, it is capacity share. See,
e.g. Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) for a study of concentration in the cement industry based
on kiln capacity as the measure of size.
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1999 and 2000 reflects the fact that growth of the system size during these
sub-periods was about twice that of the total sample size, and a similar story
explains the fall towards the end of the period. To put this into context,
Davies and Lyons (1996, p.53) report a mean HHI of 0.024 in their study of
a wide range of EU industries, which places the HHI reported for this sector
firmly towards the top end of the range.
Any Herfindahl type index may be defined in a number-equivalent form
(Adelman, 1969), which is calculated by taking the reciprocal of the HHI, so
NHHI = 1/HHI
Conceptually, NHHI is the number of (hypothetical) equal sized firms
that would generate the corresponding HHI. For this sample, the number of
equal sized firms required to generate the estimated values of HHI fell from
19 to 16. So in 2007, the estimated HHI is equivalent to 16 equal sized firms
owning all the capacity of the 18 sample member states. There are in fact
32 unequal sized firms in the sample in 2007 (see table 3.4), but the device
serves to emphasize the fact that the sector became more concentrated.
To summarize the evidence presented briefly; by three diﬀerent measures,
aggregate concentration in the sector was on an upward trend between 1998
and 2007. Comparison of the concentration ratios for this sample with ex-
isting studies reveals them to be high and that growth in the size of firms
ranked 6–10 to be particularly strong. The path of the HHI suggests the
possibility that mergers among the largest firms may be driving changes in
its value, and the number of equal sized firms that would be required to gen-
erate the estimated HHI fell from 19 to 16. The Gini coeﬃcient represented
in figure 3.4 confirms that inequality has increased around the centre of the
distribution of this sample of large firms, and that the share of capacity held
by, for example the smallest 80% of firms, declined by over 20%.
3.4.3 Mobility among leading firms
While identifying long run trends in concentration may be a useful guide as
to the likely future development of market structure, an increase in concen-
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tration may not per se constitute a cause for concern. If the identities of
the largest firms change over time, that is to say if firms are mobile within
the size distribution, even relatively high levels of concentration may not be
inconsistent with a healthy level of competition. For example it may indi-
cate an industry in which the most eﬃcient firms thrive at the expense of
less eﬃcient rivals, and absent entry barriers, may encourage entry12. By
contrast, a highly concentrated and rigid industrial structure may indicate
monopolistic tendencies (Hart and Prais, 1956).
To investigate firm mobility, the ten largest firms in 2007 were identified
and ranked by size. The rank of the top 10 in 2007 was then calculated
for each of the preceding 9 years. In this way the path of each firm’s rank
was traced. Finally, firms that had appeared in the top 10 in any sample
year were identified and treated in the same way. The results of the exercise
are presented in table 3.2, which can be thought of as a companion table to
table 3.1 and which shows the “churn” among the 15 firms that were in at
least one year, among the 10 largest firms. Several points should be noted.
First, the largest firm in the industry, EDF (France) remains in first place
throughout, and the second largest firm Enel (Italy) retains that position
with the exception of 2001, when it drops to third place. More generally, the
largest 5 firms stay in the 5 five from 2001 to the end of the sample. Looking
outside the largest 5 firms, there are some significant changes in the relative
ranks of firms, for example Suez took the rank of 32 (of 35) in 1998 but by
1999 was in sixth place 13 CEZ moved up the ranking from 12 to 8 and and
EDP from 19 to 10. Finally, 4 firms ceased to exist as independent entities.
12Which would ceteris paribus then reduce concentration again.
13Indeed in 2008 Suez moved into to second position, but that is outside the sample
period.
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Rank
Firm Origin 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EDF France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Enel Italy 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
Eon Germany 10 10 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
RWE Germany 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Vattenfall Sweden 6 7 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Suez France 32 6 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 6
Ibedrola Spain 5 5 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 7
Cez Czech Rep. 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 9 9 8
EDP Portugal 19 20 19 16 13 14 13 11 11 9
Statkraft Norway 9 9 10 9 11 11 11 10 10 10
Endesa Spain 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 .
Edison Italy 15 15 15 17 9 9 9 . . .
BE UK 14 14 9 10 12 12 12 12 12 11
Veba Germany 7 8 . . . . . . . .
NP/Innogy UK 8 17 16 14 . . . . . .
Firms which were among the largest 10 in any year. A firm that ceased to exist is denoted (.)
Source: Company annual reports, own calculations.
Table 3.2: The largest 10 firms. 1998 - 2007
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3.5 Patterns of firm growth
In this section the focus shifts from relative to absolute size. This is a nec-
essary step in evaluating the importance of the largest firms in the EU.
The transition matrix in table 3.3 tracks the growth of the 39 sample
firms between 1998–200714. The table is essentially a frequency distribution
of firms classified by their size at the start and the end of the period. The
first step in the construction of the matrix is to classify firms by size class, the
boundaries of which describe a geometric progression. There are nine classes
ranging from 0, firms in the sample that are inactive15, firms are classified
as size 1 if their assets are less than 1 GW, and so on until firms with over
64 GW of installed capacity are captured in size class 8. In 2007 there were
no firms in classes 1 or 2 which is a consequence of the sample selection
procedure and the upward movement of firms through the classes.
To see how the matrix works, first examine the diagonal highlighted in
bold face, which consists of firms that started and finished the period in the
same size category. Firms above the diagonal have been ‘promoted’, while
those below the diagonal have shrunk to a lower size class. So immediately
we can see that only 1 active firm has been ‘demoted’, while 13 firms active
throughout the period (i.e. excluding the 4 entrants shown in row 1) have
moved up by at least 1 size class.
Now consider the fifth row, firms with 4–8 GW of capacity in 1998 (size
class 4). Of the 8 firms in this category in 1998, by 2007 i has fallen into size
class 3, 3 have between 8 and 16 GW capacity, and 4 firms have remained in
class size 4. Looking now at the largest 2 class sizes, firms with more than
32 GW, we can see that membership has risen from 2 in 1998 to 5 in 2007.
The transition matrix provides unambiguous evidence of an increase in the
number of firms in the larger classes. Lastly, row 1 and column 1 (which
capture firms that are inactive) show that there were 4 inactive firms in 1998
and 7 inactive firms in 2007, so the number of active firms must have fallen.
Ceteris paribus this implies an increase in concentration.
14For other examples of the use of this type of matrix, see for example Prais (1976),
Dunne and Hughes (1994).
15I.e., firms that either entered or exited the sector during the sample period.
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Size class 2007
Size (GW) Size class
1998
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Firms 1998
0 0 4 4
< 1 1 1 1 2
1 > 2 2 1 1 2
2 > 4 3 2 2 1 5
4 > 8 4 1 4 3 8
8 > 16 5 3 6 1 1 11
16 > 32 6 2 1 2 5
32 > 64 7 1 1
> 64 8 1 1
Firms 2007 7 0 0 3 10 11 3 3 2 39
Table 3.3: Leading power generators, by size class. 1998 - 2007
56
3.5.1 Entry, exit and survival
A useful characteristic of the transition matrix is that it allows the identifi-
cation of firm entry and exit, which are examined in this section to give an
idea of changes in the structure of the sector by type of firm.
Entry and exit
Entry
4 of the 32 firms active in 2007 entered the sector (captured in the first row
of table 3.3, size class 0). All 4 entrants were in size class four by 2007. As
might be expected the mean size and its variance of entrants in the period
was smaller than other categories of firms, as shown in table 3.4.
Exit
7 or 20% of the 35 firms alive in 1998 exited in the interval (class size 0 in
the first column of table 3.3)16. Firms that ceased to exist as independent
entities were larger, by approximately 12%, than the mean size of all firms at
the start of the period and the transition matrix establishes that in contrast
with other studies (Hart and Prais, 1956, e.g.) firms that exited were not
the smallest firms, but around the middle of the distribution in 1998. This is
particularly interesting given that in this sample all firms exiting the market
were acquired by other sample firms, and motivates the further analysis of
the impact of mergers to changing industrial structure found in section 3.7.
Sample attrition
In section 3.3.2 it was noted that sample attrition may induce a downward
bias in the growth rates of surviving firms (measured against opening size)
since slow growing large firms have the option to slip down the size classes
but they still survive (and therefore remain in the sample). By contrast,
slow growing small firms may fall out of the sample. However, recall that the
transition matrix, table 3.3, shows that only one firm shrank and firms that
16In their study of quoted and unquoted UK companies Dunne and Hughes (1994) find
the same rate of attrition.
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exited were in size class four in 1998, i.e firms exited from roughly the middle
of the distribution, not the bottom. This suggests that sample attrition is
not major problem for this sample.
Survivors
Summary statistics of surviving firms identified in table 3.3 are shown in
table 3.4. There were 28 survivors and they were around 30% larger in 2007
than in 1998. However the variance in size fell by around 17% which sug-
gests falling concentration; a paradox given data presented above that shows
aggregate concentration among the full sample to have risen substantially.
Number Mean S.D
Total 1998 35 1.97 1.11
Deaths in period 7 2.23 0.74
Survivors in 1998 28 1.91 1.19
Survivors in 2007 28 2.46 0.99
Births in period 4 1.30 0.57
Total in 2007 32 2.35 0.97
Survivors are firms that were alive throughout the 10 year period.
Table 3.4: Mean and variance of size, by category.
1998 and 2007
3.6 Firm growth, firm size and aggregate con-
centration
Having developed a quite detailed picture of the composition of the sample
and how it changed over time, the next task is to investigate the relationship
between firm size and firm growth. There is no unambiguous choice of theo-
retical framework since diﬀerent frameworks imply diﬀerent outcomes. The-
ories of the firm derived from traditional neoclassical economics for example,
assume that firms face U-shaped long run average costs and the expectation
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of an inverse relationship between firm size and growth and hence an opti-
mum size is implicit. By contrast theories drawn from managerial economics
which emphasize the discretionary behavior of managers (e.g. Williamson,
1964), imply no optimum size and a positive relationship between growth
and size. This expectation is driven by the assumption that managers (as
distinct from owners) maximize growth rather than profits (or share price),
and ownership and control are separated in large firms but not in small firms.
Clearly both theories cannot simultaneously be correct.
An alternative to approaches derived from economic theory, is a frame-
work grounded in statistical theory in which alterations in the shape of an
industry in aggregate can be derived from the properties of the size distribu-
tion of firms. A stochastic framework exposes the links between firm size and
growth and aggregate concentration, so is particularly suitable in the current
context. The basic idea is this: there is a diverse range forces influencing
changes in firm size, for example profitability, the ability of management and
access to technology and inputs, as well as macroeconomic conditions. Taken
together these forces drive changes in growth and thus the size distribution
over time.
The critical assumption in the statistical approach is that firm growth
follows a random walk, so there are no systemic influences on one particular
type of firm, for example large firms. To understand the intuition, consider
the following simple two period thought experiment. In period one all firms
in a given population start out the same size, share the same probability of
expansion or shrinkage and are subject to a random array of forces; some
will grow while others shrink. Maintaining the assumption on growth and
that influences are random, in period two dispersion will increase as the
large firms get larger faster than the small firms get larger. And so on until a
small number of firms become dominant. Thus in a constant sample of firms,
rising concentration is consistent with the idea that firms grow in proportion
to their size if:
sit/sit−1 = εit (3.1)
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where sit is the size of the ith firm at time t and εit is a random variable
with mean 0 and is uncorrelated with sit−1.
3.6.1 A simple model of firm growth
The law of proportional eﬀect (LPE) is one of the simplest models of firm
growth that has been developed in the stochastic framework. It holds that
the probability of a firm growing by, e.g. 5% is the same for a firms with
assets of 10 billion Euros and 100 million Euros, and from it three main
hypotheses to be tested empirically in the next section are derived. If the
LPE is valid then (i) firms experience growth in proportion to their size, and
(ii) the dispersion of growth rates is invariant with respect to firm size. A
further implication of equation (3.1) is that (iii) growth rates do not exhibit
serial correlation, since the persistence of growth would imply a link between
opening size and growth (Singh and Whittington, 1975).
First considering hypotheses (i) and (ii). If the LPE holds, then from
equation (3.1) there will be a systematic relationship between the size in
period one with size in period two which may be estimated by equation (3.2),
the simplest form of the LPE, first proposed by Gibrat (1931).
logsit = α+ βlogsit−1 + Uit−1 (3.2)
where, logsit and logsit−1 are the logs of firm size in years t and t− 1 respec-
tively, and Ut−1 is a homoscedastic error term with mean zero. If β = 1, then
no systematic influence on firm growth is implied, so firms grow in propor-
tion to their size. This would support hypothesis (i). However, β < 1 implies
systematic factors that result in small firms growing faster than large firms,
and vice versa if β > 1.
One justification for adopting a stochastic framework was that it makes
clear the link between changes in size/growth and concentration. To see why,
note that from equation (3.2) it follows that:
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V ar(logsit) = β
2V ar(logsit−1) + V ar(Uit) (3.3)
and from hypothesis (ii) ceteris paribus concentration rises if:
V ar(logsit)
V ar(logsit−1)
> 1 (3.4)
and from (3.3), this suggests that:
V ar(Uit) > (1− β2)V ar(logsit−1) (3.5)
From hypotheses (i) and (ii) it follows that if V ar(Uit−1) = 0 and β = 1 and
in the absence of serial correlation of the dependent variable in (3.2), then
there is no systematic influence that would cause concentration to rise over
time. On the other hand, given that from (3.4) V arUit−1 > 0, concentration
may be expected to rise over time if β ≥ 1. If V arUit is large relative to
V ar(sit) then it is possible that concentration increases even if β < 1 (see
Kumar, 1985).
3.6.2 Empirical evidence on growth and firm size
Hypotheses (i) and (ii) the simple form of the LPE given in equation (3.2)
were estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and reported in the left
column of table 3.5. Estimating autoregressive models such as equation (3.2)
by OLS may generate estimators that are inconsistent due to serial correlation
in the error term (Greene, 2000, p.533), so the results reported include robust
standard errors.
Looking first at the overall fit of the model, the R2 = .93 and the p
value suggest that the model captures the vast majority of the influence on
size. The coeﬃcient of 0.94 on βˆ is highly significant but is found not to be
significantly diﬀerent from 1. This result supports hypothesis (i), that firm
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growth is approximately proportionate to firm size.
Turning now to hypothesis (ii), that the dispersion of growth rates is
invariant with respect to size. A Breusch and Pagan test rejected (at the
0.1% level) the hypothesis that the error term is homoscedastic. It was
shown in table 3.4 that the variance of growth rates varies inversely with
firm size so the intuition for this result is easy to see; large firms may be
expected to have a ‘smoother’ rate of growth for the same reason that they
are less likely to exit the market than small firms - diversification spreads
the risk of low growth and thus reduces the variability of growth.
In summary, there is evidence that the LPE holds for this sample of 28
surviving firms - firms have grown more or less in proportion to their size.
The persistence of growth
The form of the LPE in equation (3.2) implies no serial correlation between
growth rates; hypothesis (iii) was tested by estimating equation (3.6) by OLS:
log(sit/sit−1) = α+ βlogsit−1 + γlog(sit−1/sit−2) + ￿it (3.6)
where t−1 and t−2 indicate lags of one and two years. The equation postulates
that proportionate firm growth is a function of firm size at time t−1 and
growth in the period t−1 – t−2. Results are given in the right hand column of
table 3.5. The coeﬃcient on βˆ is negative and very small, though significant
at the 1% level. This shows that smaller firms grew slightly faster than larger
firms. These results are strikingly similar in terms of the magnitude and
sign of the coeﬃcients to those found by Kumar (1985) though Singh and
Whittington (1975) reported a weak positive relationship between growth
and size.
The coeﬃcient on γˆ, the log of past growth, is weakly positive but not
significant, which suggests that serial correlation in growth rates is not a
problem in this sample and implies that OLS estimates will be consistent.
Interestingly, the absence of serial correlation may indicate the prevalence of
growth by merger rather than organic growth since it is likely that organic
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Dependent variable
logsit a log(sit/sit−1) b
αˆ 0·2 ∗ ∗ 0·15 ∗ ∗∗
(0·03) (0·04)
βˆ 0·94 ∗ ∗∗ −0·04 ∗ ∗
(0·03) (0·01)
γˆ · 0·03
· (0·05)
R2 within 0·54 0·07
R2 between 0·99 0·13
R2 overall 0·93 0·04
n 28 28
Prob > chi 0·000 0·01
a logsit = α+ βlogsit−1 + ￿it
b log(sit/sit−1) = α+ βlogsit−1 + γlog(sit−1/sit−2) + ￿it
** indicates significance at 1% level.
*** indicates significance at 0.1% level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.5: OLS Regression results, firm growth and persistence
of growth. 1998-2007
growth is likely to be more persistent than growth by merger. Sustained
organic growth is delivered by in-house managerial and technological ability
and the building of human capital within the firm, which is a ongoing com-
mitment. By contrast, growth by merger is by definition a discrete event.
Although it may be argued that serial mergers also require specific exper-
tise, the ubiquity of professional and financial services firms means that the
required expertise, which may diﬀer from deal to deal, can be bought in as
required. It is to the role of mergers in growth that attention is now turned.
3.7 Mergers and firm growth
The preceding analysis has revealed several indicators that suggest mergers
may have been important in the changing structure of the industry. The
changes in the capacities of the largest firms presented in table 3.1 indicated
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large discrete changes in size which was supported by the step-wise path of
the HHI shown in figure 3.5. The transition matrix table 3.3 showed that
7 firms exited the industry, and we know that all were taken over by other
sample firms. It was shown in section 3.5.1 that firms exited from the middle
of the distribution. Finally, the lack of evidence of the persistence of growth
is a further hint. Together, these indicators motivate the final step of the
analysis, the exploration of the impact of mergers on the observed increase
in aggregate concentration.
3.7.1 The number of mergers
Le´veˆque (2008) surveys 247 mergers between power and gas firms between
1998 and 2007, of which 140 involved the power generation assets of firms in
this sample. Figure 3.6 shows the number of such mergers by year.
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Figure 3.6: Mergers involving generation assets. 1998 – 2007
At first sight the fact that only one merger took place in 2004 seems
puzzling, but it may be explained by the fact that in that year a new Com-
missioner for Competition, Ms. Neelie Kroes took oﬃce in DG Competition
and the revised EC Merger Regulation (EC, 2004) incorporating new hori-
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zontal merger guidelines came into force17. Given the degree of influence of
the EU merger guidelines and past EC decisions over firms’ merger strategies
(Ormosi, 2010) presumably the uncertainty associated with these changes in-
duced firms to wait before launching merger bids.
3.7.2 The merger rate
The ‘merger rate’ gives an idea of the proportion of firms engaged in merger
activity, but as (Hart, 1979) shows, the way in which the number of firms in
the sample is defined has a powerful eﬀect on the results of an assessment of
the impact of mergers on concentration. No estimate of total merger activity
among the population as a whole is available, so it is not possible to calculate
the coverage of this merger data and hence the results must be interpreted
with caution. In this study the probability of mergers in the total population
is approximated by calculating the merger rate M is, as advocated by Hart
(ibid., p.222,), defined as:
M =
n￿
i=1
mi/n (3.7)
where mi is the number of sample firms acquiring or selling generation assets
in the ith year and n the number of firms in the sample.
Figure 3.7 shows how the ‘merger rate’ has changed over time based on the
full sample of 39 firms. At its peak in 2005, over 30% of the sample firms were
engaged in merger activity and the mean merger rate was 20%, though the
possible omission of some mergers due to data restrictions mentioned above
would bias this estimate downwards. This level of merger activity shows that
mergers significantly influenced post liberalization industry structure.
17Thanks to participants at the CCP Seminar, UEA 23 April 2010 for this observation.
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Figure 3.7: The merger rate. 1998 – 2007
3.7.3 The influence of mergers on firm growth
The empirical literature assessing the quantitative influence of mergers in
explaining the upward trend in concentration provides no unambiguous con-
clusions, despite its large volume (see Curry and George, 1983). Following
Hart and Prais (1956) and Hannah and Kay (1977), in this study the impact
of mergers was evaluated using a counterfactual technique. The involved
constructing an artificial or notional version of what would have happened
if certain assumptions were true, and then comparing the results with what
actually happened.
The counterfactual was generated as follows. First the net merger activity
of each surviving firm that engaged in merger activity was calculated by
subtracting divestitures by merger from growth by merger18. Then a notional
2007 distribution was created by adding the net merger activity for each firm
to its 1998 size.
The real and notional 2007 distributions of the 19 surviving, merging
firms had very similar means and variances though tests showed statistical
18To avoid incorporating organic growth in the acquired firm in merger growth of the
acquiring firm, the size of acquired firms was evaluated in 1998, at the start of the period.
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equivalence of neither the mean nor the variance. The mean size of surviving
merging firms was considerable larger in 2007 than the mean size of the
same 19 firms in 1998. Merging survivors also experienced stronger growth
than the sample of surviving firms; approximately 34% as against 30% for
all surviving firms.
Actual Notional
1998 2007 2007
Number 19 19 19
Mean 2.09 2.81 2.77
Variance 1.34 0.99 1.02
Surviving firms are those that were alive throughout the period.
Size is log of firm size.
Table 3.6: Actual and notional firm size distributions.
Discussing an earlier study, (Weston, 1953), Stigler (1956) notes that
the absolute growth of firms is irrelevant if the relationship between firm
growth and changes in concentration is the object of interest, and argues
that the unit of measurement must be firm shares of total industry size.
Therefore, to assess the impact of mergers on aggregate concentration, the
HHI implied by the notional 2007 distribution was calculated and is shown
alongside the actual HHI in figure 3.8. It confirms that, using a measure
which reflects firm shares, the increase in concentration observed over the
period and discussed above can be accounted for by growth, due in very
large measure to mergers. The notional HHI is slightly higher than the real
HHI, which may be explained by ex-post portfolio rationalization and merger
remedies.
To summarize, for the firms that survived the whole period and engaged
in merger activity, mergers accounted for almost all growth. This result has
several interesting implications and poses a number of questions. First, it
implies that, on average, mergers were a substitute for greenfield expansion.
Data collected by the European transmission systems operator UCTE, shows
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Figure 3.8: HHI and notional HHI
that minimum capacity margins across the UCTE control area as a whole
exceeded the 5% lower threshold19(UCTE, 2004). With installed capacity
above the minimum required by the transmission systems operators, it is
diﬃcult to see where the incentive to build new capacity would come from.
Nevertheless, some firms did implement an expansion strategy which which
has been achieved by the relatively risky method of growth by merger, a result
which raises questions about the motivation for mergers, which is discussed
below.
3.8 Conclusion and discussion
The analysis of the size distribution and merger activity of the largest power
generators which control over 80% of total installed capacity in their 18
European countries between 1998 –2007, has yielded the following stylized
facts about the changing structure of the sector.
1. The mean size of firms operating in 2007 was 38% larger than the mean
size of those operating in 1998, large firms controlled an increasing
19Except 2005 when it fell to 4.6%
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proportion of total installed capacity and mobility among the ranks of
the largest firms was very low.
2. For firms that were active throughout the period, the LPE appears to
hold; that is to say, firms grew approximately in proportion to their
size, though for the sample as a whole, proportionate growth was found
to be weakly but inversely related to size.
3. Aggregate concentration was shown by three diﬀerent measures to be
unambiguously trending upwards, and the final period exhibited sharp
upward growth. The level of aggregate concentration shown by both
concentration ratios and the HHI was shown to be high by compar-
ison with earlier studies on several industrial sectors. The number-
equivalent HHI fell from 19 to 16, meaning that in 2007, 16 hypothetical
equal sized firms would be required to generate the estimated HHI.
4. Twenty percent of firms operating in 1998 exited the sector, and all
were acquired by other sample firms.
5. Mergers among firms operational throughout the period drove almost
all the increase in concentration for the sample as a whole, 1998 to
2007.
The key objectives of this chapter, i.e. to expose the link between con-
centration and the evolution of firm size, and to examine the role of mergers
in this evolutionary process, will now be discussed in turn. Concentration
in the hypothetical EU single market has risen markedly since the start of
sector liberalization, and this result is not sensitive to the measure of con-
centration. Overall growth in the sector was approximately 20%, so this
strong upward trend was initially puzzling. The puzzle was resolved by re-
calling that the components of aggregate concentration include both firm size
and firm numbers, and it was shown that on average the sample firms have
become considerably larger over the period and firm numbers have fallen.
Analysis of concentration ratios showed that by 2007 the largest 3 and 5
firms owned respectively 36% and 47% of the total capacity owned by sample
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firms. The absolute value of the EU HHI was low by comparison with the
thresholds set by competition authorities for the purpose of investigating
potential abuse of market power, though it was shown to be high relative to
aggregate concentration calculated for other industries in previous studies.
However, market power is not the subject of this thesis. Rather it is about
the introduction of competition into a formerly monopolized sector and with
evaluating progress towards the hypothetical single market. So more relevant
than the absolute value of the HHI is its trajectory. The numbers-equivalent
HHI has an intuitive interpretation; it fell from 19 to 16 despite the best
eﬀorts of the EC to introduce competition and reduce concentration.
Evidence has been presented that the sample firms grew roughly propor-
tionately to their size, though the literature is ambiguous in its predictions.
Some studies find a systematic relationship (e.g. Aaronovitch and Sawyer,
1975, Kumar, 1985) while others do not (e.g. Hymer and Pashigian, 1962),
or find them only for large firms Hall (1987). It is clear from both the results
of this study and this existing literature that these results are sensitive to
the sample chosen (Kumar, 1985). The result here that the growth of firms
active throughout the period was more or less proportionate to their size car-
ries the interesting implication that ceteris paribus concentration would have
risen simply as a result of the statistical properties of the size distribution as
discussed in section 3.6.1.
However section 3.7 showed that the majority of the growth in the sample
as a whole was accounted for by the merger activity of the 19 firms that were
both active throughout the period and which engaged in merger activity.
Reserve margins20 were generally well above the minimum required by the
transmission system operators (UCTE, 2008) and since it is peak demand
that drives capacity investments, motivation for greenfield expansion was
low. In a standard neoclassical profit maximizing framework, firms on an
expansionist path have a choice between expansion by merger and organic
growth and will choose the cost minimizing option. In Cournot equilibrium,
large firms have lower marginal costs so welfare may be improved by a merger
that causes an increase in output of eﬃcient firms at the expense of ineﬃcient
20The excess of capacity over peak demand.
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rivals (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). From this perspective, mergers may be
eﬃciency enhancing. Yet the literature on the eﬃciency eﬀects of mergers is
ambiguous both with respect to the existence of positive welfare eﬀects and
to their allocation between consumers, acquiring and target firms. A recent
study of mergers in US electricity power distribution (Kwoka and Pollitt,
2007) find clear evidence that post merger cost performance is not enhanced,
which leaves open the question of motivation: on the grounds of eﬃciency,
the case for ‘big[ger] business’ is far from proven.
Alternative theories that might help to explain the motivation for merger
are drawn from the managerialist perspective. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)
studied the merger wave of the 1980s and found strategic explanations for
much of the merger activity in the 1980s, and show that merger activity is
clustered within industries that have experienced a shock, for example from
deregulation or rapid technological change. Gorton et al. (2009) develop
and test empirically a theoretical model in which the size distribution of
firms is a key determinant of merger activity. In industries exhibiting the
structure revealed in the early part of this study, that is to say a dominant
firm larger than the combined size of the second and third largest, it is shown
that given low enough private benefits to managers, the net present value of
acquisitions can be expected to be positive as firms use merger activity to
position themselves to attract merger bids in the future.
The politicization of the sector is very high, in part due to the historical
links between the state and the power industry that were discussed in sec-
tion 3.2. Indeed Mez (2003) claims that in Germany the electricity supply
sector has been a political and economic cartel for decades, and that it is
a “state within a state” (ibid., p.193). Whether or not that is the reality,
there is at least a theoretical possibility that tacit collusion was a motive
for the observed merger activity. Tacit collusion is defined as firm strategies
that result in outcomes (in price or quantity terms for example) that may
be similar to collusive outcomes resulting from a cartel or explicit collusion,
although it does not imply that direct communication between the market
participants is necessary (Ivaldi et al., 2003). The structural conditions for
sustaining tacit collusion, such as the number of competitors, the presence
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of entry barriers, the frequency of interaction and the relatively low trans-
parency in electricity markets21 (Hooper et al., 2010) are present. Collusion
is also easier to sustain if firms are more symmetric with respect to cost struc-
ture or production capacity (Ivaldi et al., 2003), and this study has shown
that the very largest firms are becoming more symmetric in terms of capac-
ities. Conversely, (Caves and Porter, 1978) show that instability in market
shares impinges on the ability of oligopolists to strike and maintain implicit
deals.
In his seminal paper Stigler (1964, p.45) states that “Collusion of firms
can take many forms, of which the most comprehensive is outright merger”.
We have presented no evidence at all that tacit collusion has taken place in
the power sector. Having said that, it is necessarily very diﬃcult to detect
and prove. Since mergers oﬀer the opportunity for firms to take existing
capacity oﬀ the system, and given the important contribution of mergers
to the observed structural change, we merely seek vigilance on the part of
competition authorities with respect to electricity mergers, and to suggest the
explicit consideration of the long run evolution of the market. The results
of this study for the first time sketch out temporal changes in structure at
the EU level, which have taken place during a phase in which EU merger
policy which has been described in the following way: “In contrast to the
United States, mergers between energy companies have been subject to rather
relaxed standards” (Newbery, 2007, p.2). On the basis of these findings, no
comment may be made regarding the potential abuse of market power, but
deliberately slightly mis-quoting White (2002), if aggregate concentration
does pose concerns, then they seem to have got more serious since 1998.
21With the exception of the Nordic countries.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
FIRM MULTINATIONALITY
4.1 Introduction
Strategic interactions between firms aﬀect the competitive conditions within
markets and may influence decisions with respect to multinationality. This
chapter presents the results of a detailed empirical analysis of one specific
aspect of firm strategy, the decision to locate production in more than one
country, or horizontal multinationality1. Links between firm multinationality
and industrial and regulatory structure are explored in an attempt to discover
whether firms pursue similar or diﬀerent strategies and to assess the influence
of multinational corporate strategies on the integration of European power
markets. Taking a slightly diﬀerent perspective, the eﬀect of firm ‘nationality’
on multinationality is investigated.
The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows: after outlining the
context for the study in the next section, section 4.3 presents estimates of
multinationality for the sample firms and discusses the nationality of multi-
nationals. The spatial decomposition of firm size is presented in section 4.4
and the relative importance of country share and country size to aggregate
firm size evaluated. Section 4.5 is the heart of the chapter. In it the empirical
1Throughout this chapter the term multinationality is used to mean horizontal multi-
nationality only, i.e. a firm is multinational if it owns generation capacity in more than
one country.
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model is developed, the estimation procedure discussed and the econometric
results reported. The conclusions and implications of the chapter are to be
found in the final section.
4.2 Literature
In this section the academic literature relating to firm multinationality and
multimarket contact are reviewed to provide some context for the study.
4.2.1 Multinational firms
Standard theories of the multinational enterprise or firm (MNE) are based
on the notion of eﬃciency. Firms operating in multiple national markets
can achieve cost savings, or economies of scope (Panzar and Willig, 1981) by
sharing resources over markets (Penrose, 1959, Teece, 1980). The necessary
conditions for the emergence of (horizontal) MNEs are uncontroversial; the
eﬃciency of the dispersed i) location of production and ii) common owner-
ship of production, and iii) the profitable application of the specific asset is
achieved more eﬃciently within the MNE than by renting it out to another
firm (Dunning, 1988).
Under these conditions, MNE’s enjoy a net-revenue advantage derived
either from minimizing production costs and/or non-production activities.
Non-production advantages, or firm-specific assets (Caves, 2007, p.3) have
the following properties i) the firm can use the asset or its services, but
cannot necessarily sell or contract on it, ii) its productivity may diﬀer from
similar assets owned by rivals, iii) the asset or its productivity advantage is
mobile across national borders and iv) its longevity is high relative to the
firm’s planning horizon, though it may be depreciable.
However, sustained advantage is derived from non-production advantages,
because production cost advantages are likely to be based on technological
improvements which will eventually be available to all market participants
(Porter, 1991). Selling or contracting on firm-specific assets that are not
site-specific is strongly associated with market failure; for example, it is easy
to see that the collective, interdependent skills of a highly specialized and
experienced research team built up over years by firm A cannot be readily
expected to enjoy the same eﬃciency if transfered to firm B. In this way a
competitive advantage is confered on the ‘owner’ of specific assets, which is
not easily appropriated or imitated.
Transaction costs theory is central to the specific asset theory of the
MNE. Transaction costs2 arise as a result of the inability to write complete
contracts in the face of asymmetric information, bounded rationality and
limited foresight. Firms will choose to undertake transactions outside the
firm, i.e. in the market, if the cost of doing so is lower than the cost of
transacting within the firm (Coase, 1937). If the cost of transacting in the
market is too high relative to the cost within the firm then the market fails
and the transaction takes place within the firm. The MNE emerges for the
same reason - the cost of transacting in the market is too high relative to
the cost of internalizing the cost of specific assets. Transaction costs will be
higher if there is a possibility that the supplier of a key input has monopoly
power or if inputs are site specific (Rose and Joskow, 1990), or if reputation
is important.
Hymer (1960) developed an alternative theory of the MNE based on the
notion that firms seek to increase profit over time by increasing their market
power in the following way. Consider a firm that has either single or collective
dominance and which may therefore set price above marginal cost. Having
exhausted growth opportunities in their domestic market, the firm follows
a horizontal growth strategy, which involves expanding production (in the
presence of economies of scale), or acquiring smaller or less profitable firms
through mergers and acquisitions.
Statistical tests of the theory of the horizontal MNE in a given industry
have been dominated by studies that relate structural characteristics of the
industry to the degree of multinationality. The usual dependent variables
may be loosely termed ‘outbound’ and ‘inbound’ foreign direct investment
and two key results emerge consistently. First, the positive influence of both
firm-specific assets and the intensive use of skilled labour is confirmed (e.g.
2Costs defined as those costs not directly associated with production.
75
Lall, 1980, Giulietti et al., 2004). Second, the general coordinating capacity
of the firm measured by, for example multiplant operations is strongly asso-
ciated with multinationality. In the USA multiplant operations were found
to be a significant predictor for expansion in to Canada (Caves, 1974) and
similarly multiplant operations among German firms were related to higher
multinationality (Juhl, 1985) but not for UK firms Caves (ibid).
The transactions-cost approach to explain MNEs motivates an obvious
question; do MNE’s behave diﬀerently from firms that compete only in a sin-
gle market? This question may be understood with reference to the notion
of strategic groups (Caves, 2007), or groups of similar firms that recognize
their interdependency, share similar goals and tend to respond similarly to
a particular shock, as well as by the theory of multimarket contact (see be-
low). Industries characterized by complex strategic group structures are more
likely to be highly competitive and conversely, firms in industries with a more
symmetric strategic group structure may enjoy enhanced ability to sustain
collusion. Evidence of the presence of strategic groups in a given industry
may provide some insight into the likely direction in which competitive con-
ditions may evolve in the future since, it is argued, diﬀerences in strategic
groups are stable and significant features of industrial structure (Newman,
1978, p.417).
4.2.2 Multimarket contact
Multimarket contact refers to encounters between firms (including MNEs)
in multiple markets3. The theory of multimarket contact proposes that mu-
tual forebearance lessens the intensity of competition between two firms as
the number of markets served by both firms increases, as a result of firm
interdependence (Nickerson, 1997). In a seminal study which explicitly links
industry structure and firm behaviour, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show
that under plausible assumptions, cooperative (collusive) outcomes are more
easily sustained when rivals in a given industry meet in many markets than
3For the purpose of this chapter, markets are defined as the aggregate demand within
a given country.
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when they meet only in a single market. The building of long-term coop-
erative and reciprocal relationships between rivals results in ‘mutual fore-
bearance’, where firms decline to compete aggressively. The argument is
that collusive behaviour is maintained since as the number of overlapping
markets increases, so does each firm’s ability to punish rivals who deviate.
However, as Bernheim and Whinston argue, this argument merely suggests
that increased multimarket contact raises the costs and benefits of an opti-
mal deviation proportionately. The key contribution of the Bernheim paper
is that it clarifies that the mechanism for the maintenance of the optimal col-
lusive equilibrium, which is diﬀerent depending on whether the firms treat
the markets separately or as one. In the latter case, firms will realise that
punishment for deviation will be incurred in both markets. Then a firm
deciding to deviate will deviate in both markets, eﬀectively pooling the in-
centive constraints of both markets and possibly leading to a relaxation of
binding incentive constraints and raising collusive profits.
Three key findings emerge from the paper. First, in a broad range of situ-
ations multimarket contact is shown to constrain the intensity of competition
by relaxing incentive constraints. Second, the gains made by firms engaging
in multimarket contact may result in real practical eﬀects. Third, the real
eﬀects caused by multimarket contact are not necessarily socially undesir-
able. However if firms diﬀer in technical expertise and capability, or in MNE
parlance, specific assets, which allow them to develop ‘spheres of influence’,
then simultaneous competition in several markets may lead to specialization
and the maintenance of prices above the competitive level.
Empirical tests of the eﬀect of multimarket contact typically consider
the impact on prevailing prices or firm profitabilty, and tend to support the
theory that multimarket contacts blunts competition. Increased contact has
been shown to raise prices above the levels sustainable in a competitive mar-
ket in mobile telecoms (Parker and Ro¨ller, 1997) and airline tickets (Evans
and Kessides, 1994). Evans and Kessides in particular supports the inclusion
in multimarket contact models, of a behavioural explanation of firm strategy
in that in their paper it is fear of punitive retaliation by rivals encountered
frequently in other city-market pairings that drives firms to set prices above
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the competitive level. In a study of the cement industry Jans and Rosenbaum
(1997) find that the Lerner index is reduced by multimarket contact when
using a simple measure of the frequency of contact, but when the measure
accounts for concentration in the non-home market a postive relationship
between the Lerner Index and multimarket contact is established. Similarly
for the banking sector, (Pilloﬀ, 1999) finds a positive correlation between
profitability and contact in the group of firms most exposed to multimarket
contact, and concludes that contact between firms becomes more of an issue
as the industry becomes more concentrated.
Summary
Two questions amenable to empirical testing emerge from this overview of the
overlapping concepts of firm multinationality and multimarket contact. Do
MNE’s have firm-specific assets and the ability to coordinate activities across
separate markets? The market power theory of MNEs explains their presence
as the outcome of firms’ desire to expand profit over time by extending their
market power, so what is the evidence on the link between monopoly power
and MNE?
4.3 Multinationality in power generation
Little is know about firm multinationality among EU based power generators.
Indeed no study of the sector explicitly evaluating multinationality at the firm
level could be found, which is surprising given then importance attached by
the EC to the creation of an eﬀective single market in electricity. Therefore
this section can be seen as a baseline. Analysis of sample statistics describes
the multinationality of generators based in the EU which are examined in
more depth using simple inferential statistics. MNE’s or multinational firms
are defined as those that own interests in a firm based in another country, or
that have set up a subsidiary in another country (Markusen, 2004).
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4.3.1 Measuring the multinationality of firms
Firm multinationality is measured in two ways. The initial decision to be-
come an MNE is captured in a binary variableMNAT , which takes the value
of 1 if a firm owns generation assets outside its member state of origin and
zero otherwise. The second measure of multinationality is theM index which
reflects the degree to which a firm is geographically diversified. The M score
for each firm is a Hirschmann-Herfindahl based index equal to the weighted
sum of their multinationality aggregated across all member states in which
they own capacity. The index was first applied to spatial diversification in
Davies and Lyons (1996) and is a variant on Berry’s index of diversification
(1974). If the capacity of firm i in member state k is denoted xik and the ag-
gregate size of the firm is xi, then M is calculated by summing their squared
shares of capacity in each member state and then taking the complement:
Mi = 1−
￿
k
(xik)
2/(xi)
2 (4.1)
A firm which controls no generation assets outside its member state of origin
would have an M score of 0, and if k = 25, the theoretical maximum value
of M is 1− 25−1, which would indicate a firm with equal sized operations in
each of the 25 equal sized member states.
A useful version of the index is the numbers equivalent of multinationality,
NMi which is the reciprocal ofM . NM represents the number of equal sized
firms that would be required to generate the equivalent M value (Adelman,
1969), and is given by:
NMi = (1−Mi)−1 (4.2)
NM will fall into the range 1, where a firm holds no generation assets outside
their member state of origin, to a theoretical maximum of 25, which would
indicate the case where all firms own equal capacity in each equally sized
member state i.e the situation corresponding with M = 1− 251.
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4.3.2 Data
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on the market share matrix
for power generation analyzed in Chapter 2. To recap, there are 54 firms on
the matrix and firm size is measured by installed capacity (GW) in each of
25 member states. The analysis covers the years 1998 to 2007. Data on the
level of experience of national independent energy regulators was gathered
from their websites during late 2009.
4.3.3 The multinationality of firms
The number of MNEs4 on the matrix rose from 8 in 1998 to 17 in 2007 and
histograms for both years are shown in figure 4.1. As expected they are
strongly positively skewed; the median is in all years less than the mean.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of multinational firms. 1998 and 2007
The distribution for 2007 suggests the existence of three multinational
strategies that can be viewed as elements around which firms may coalesce
into strategic groups. A NM < 1.5 describes a firm that may be termed
minimally multinational, 1.5 < NM < 2 a moderately multinational firm
4I.e. excluding firms with no generation assets outside their member state of origin.
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and NM > 2 a highly multinational firm. Table 4.1 lists the set of multi-
national firms in 2007 according to multinational strategy. There may be
a slight tendency for firms based in larger countries to be multinational,
though Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal which are all fairly small, are
also home to MNEs. It is interesting to note that the only former communist
state that appears in the table the Czech Republic.
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Minimal multinationality Moderate multinationality High multinationality
Firm Origin NM Firm Origin NM Firm Origin NM
CEZ CZ 1.30 EDP PT 1.75 Suez FR 4.24
Essent NL 1.25 Iderdrola ES 1.59 Vattenfall SE 3.34
Centrica UK 1.19 RWE DE 1.56 EON DE 3.06
Acciona ES 1.15 EDF FR 1.55 IP UK 2.41
Verbund AT 1.10 Enel IT 2.21
Statkraft NO 1.10 GDF FR 2.16
Fortum FL 2.04
Highly multinational firms are those with NM > 2
Moderately multinational firms are those with 1.5 < NM < 2
Minimally multinational firms are those with NM < 1.5
Table 4.1: Multinational strategies. 2007
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4.3.4 The nationality of multinational firms
The relationship between firm nationality and its degree of multinationality
is explored in this section. Power generation is an industry where there are
real barriers to cross-border trade caused by a combination of a lack of inter-
connector capacity, congestion on inter-connectors and poorly coordinated
capacity allocation procedures. If it is assumed that, in accordance with
European law, there is regulated third party access to inter-connectors, i.e.
firms which own both inter-connectors and generation capacity are prevented
from discriminating against rivals with respect to capacity allocation, firms
wishing to serve markets outside their home market must own capacity in
those markets if they are not to risk revenue volatility due to congestion. It
is therefore likely that the growth strategy of a highly multinational firm, is
related to conditions in its member state of origin.
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the extent of firm multinational tendencies
by country of origin for 1998 and 2007. The table, which is is ordered by
declining value of the mean of NM for all firms, is essentially a ranking of
countries that seem to be the most conducive to multinationality. Sweden is
the ‘most multinational’ country throughout the sample period and Germany
has moved from rank 5 to rank 3, which signifies a change in strategy. It is
interesting to note that with the exception of Norway and the Czech republic,
all countries hosting multinationals are members of the EU15. It appears that
firms based in the former Eastern European countries, which have historically
had monopolistic incumbents, have in general not adopted a multinational
strategy.
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1998 2007
Origin Number of firms Mean NM Origin Number of firms Mean NM
Total Mnata % All firms Mnat only Total Mnata % All firms Mnat only
SE 1 1 100 2.20 2.20 SE 1 1 100 3.37 3.37
FR 3 2 67 1.57 1.82 FR 3 3 100 2.65 2.65
FL 2 7 50 1.06 1.11 DE 2 2 100 2.31 2.31
ES 3 2 67 1.03 10.4 IT 3 1 33 1.40 2.21
DE 2 1 50 1.02 1.05 FL 2. 1 50 1.52 2.04
NO 2 1 50 1.02 1.05 UK 4 2 50 1.40 1.80
PT 1 1 100 1.75 1.75
ES 2 2 100 1.36 1.36
CZ 1 1 100 1.30 1.30
NL 2 1 50 1.12 1.24
AT 5 1 20 1.02 1.10
NO 2 1 50 1.05 1.10
a Number of multinational firms.
Table 4.2: Multinationality by country of origin. 1998 and 2007
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Close examination of these estimates of multinationality suggests that the
extent of multinationality may be related both to country level characteristics
(in particular country size) and perhaps also to regional characteristics. Swe-
den, Norway and Finland were hosts to multinational firms in both 1998 and
2007, and Nordpool was the first functioning cross border power exchange,
and remains the most liquid power exchange in the EU. This possibility is
explored in section 4.6.
4.3.5 Decomposition of aggregate firm size in geograph-
ical space
A firm may be large because it has a substantial share of capacity in a large
home member state or it may own production assets in several countries, or
both. Within a given industry, patterns of multinationality may be based
on regional, national and firm-specific factors. For example, assuming that
firms operate only in their member state of origin, those that originate in
small member states will reach the limits to growth sooner than those based
in a large member state, which suggests an inverse relationship between the
size of the member state of origin and the extent of multinationality. On the
other hand, a monopolist has already reached the maximum size at home
and must go multinational if their objective is to achieve growth.
The analysis that follows is based on what is essentially an accounting
identity linking three dimensions of aggregate firm size; multinationality,
typical share of country output and typical size of country first developed
in Davies and Lyons (1996). To understand the idea more fully, imagine a
firm of aggregate size 100. Several structures may produce such a firm; for
example, it may have i) a 10% share in one country of size 1,000 or ii) a 20%
share of one country of size 500 or iii) a 1% share in each of ten countries
each of which is size 1,000. Firm size can then be decomposed according to
the following identity:
FMSIZE ≡ CS ×NATS ×NM (4.3)
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Index Symbol Formula
Aggregate firm size FMSIZE xi
Country size xk
Typical country share CS
￿
k CSik(xik/xi)
where CSik = xik/xk
Multinationality M 1−￿k(xik)2/(xi)2
Number equivalent NM (1−Mi)−1
Typical size member state NATS
￿
k(uikxk)
where uik = (xikCSik)/
￿
k(xikCSik)
Table 4.3: Indices of firm structure
where the definitions of the indices are given in table 4.3.
The index for firm i’s typical share of national capacity, termed country
share (CS) is their weighted average share aggregated across countries in
which they are active; the weight is the share of capacity in each country.
NATS, or the national size is the weighted average size of all countries in
which the firm owns capacity; the weight being firm i’s size in country k
multiplied by its share in that country. This method of weighting results in
increased emphasis on asset holdings that are simultaneously of consequence
within the firm itself and within the country.
4.4 Analysis of means and variances of multi-
national firms
An analysis of geometric means at the start and end of the period is re-
ported in the top part of table 4.4. There was a 32% reduction in the mean
size of multinational firms, which reflects the entry of smaller firms into the
multinational group (see table 4.1). The typical country share has fallen
dramatically from 48% to only 18% which is interpreted as a reflection of
the ongoing tendency for countries of all sizes to privatize their power mar-
kets and may indicate some degree of fragmentation within national power
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markets. The typical size of the member state in which MNEs operate in-
creased by 32% which may again reflect privatization programmes, but also
forced divestiture to comply with competition policy remedies with respect
to cross-border mergers. Finally, the mean extent of multinationality among
MNEs increased by 36%.
To investigate the relative importance of each component of firm size in
the total variation in FMSIZE, an analysis of variance is reported in the
lower part of table 4.4, based on the logarithmic version of the decomposition
in equation (4.3):
V (fmsize) ≡ V (ns)+V (cs)+V (nm)+2C(ns, cs)+2C(ns, nm)+2C(cs, nm)
where V denotes variance, C denotes covariance and lower case symbols ns,
cs and nm denote logarithms of NATS, CS and NM respectively.
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Analysis of geometric means
FMSIZE ≡ NATS × CS × NM
1998 21.35 ≡ 33.99 × 0.48 × 1.30
2007 14.57 ≡ 45.00 × 0.18 × 1.78
Analysis of variances
V (fmsize) ≡ V (ns) + V (cs) + V (nm) + 2C(ns, cs) + 2C(ns, nm) + 2C(cs, nm)
1998 0.936 ≡ 0.711 + 0.388 + 0.154 - 0.118 - 0.424 + 0.226
(100) ≡ (76) + (41) + (16) - (13) - (45) + (24)
2007 1.278 ≡ 0.567 + 1.367 + 0.171 - 0.694 + 0.087 - 0.220
(100) ≡ (44) + (107) + (13) - (54) + (7) - (17)
V = variance, C = covariance
ns = log NATS, cs = log CS, nm = log NM
Numbers in parentheses represent share of total variation.
Multinational firms only.
Table 4.4: The spatial decomposition of aggregate firm size.
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In 1998 the variance of national size NATS, accounted for 76% of the
variance in the size of multinational firms and the typical country share (CS)
and multinationality (NM) for 41% and 16% respectively. NATS is highly
correlated (correlation coeﬃcient = 0.72) with the size of a firm’s country of
origin, so in 1998, just after the start of liberalization, the size of a firm’s
country of origin was an important influence on the variance in firm size, far
more so than either CS or in particular, NM . The covariance terms reveal
that multinationality and country share are positively correlated, so firms
with large shares of installed capacity within individual countries were more
likely to be multinational. Conversely, national size and multinationality are
negatively correlated, so the strong eﬀect of national size on overall vari-
ation is tempered by multinationality; firms in larger countries tend to be
less multinational. Similarly, national size and country share are negatively
correlated which means that firms in large countries tend to have a smaller
share in those countries.
In 2007 the strongest component of variation in firm size is country share,
followed by national size, and the contribution of multinationality has fallen
from 16% to 13%. The negative correlation between national size and country
share remains, but the sign on the other two covariance terms has changed.
Firms in large countries are more likely to be multinational while those with
large country shares are less likely to be multinational.
Comparing 2007 to 1998, it seems that corporate strategy has changed
considerably, perhaps in response to the new operating environment brought
about by liberalization. It is unsurprising that in an industry where an
incumbent monopolist was historically the norm, that national size appears
to exercise a strong influence on firm size, and this observation is explored
in the next sections.
4.5 Empirical model
Recall that from section 4.3, there are two measures of multinationality
MNAT , the decision to become an MNE, and NM , a measure of the extent
of the multinationality of multinational firms. These are the dependent vari-
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ables in the model. In this section the hypotheses and explanatory variables
are discussed and the empirical model presented. Variables relate to the firm,
country and regional level factors which the literature has shown to aﬀect
multinationality. Since the analysis is of a specific sector, firms are assumed
to share similar characteristics such as minimum eﬃcient scale, research and
development ratios and transport costs etc., so no industry level variables
are included.
4.5.1 Firm size
The eﬀect of firm-specific assets would be tested directly on variables that
have been shown to be robust predictors of multinationality, in particular
firm R&D and advertising ratios (Caves, 2007). However, these measure are
not really appropriate in the context in which this study is set. First, it
has been shown that R&D ratios have been severely negatively aﬀected by
deregulation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). Second, advertising spending is not
likely to be indicative of the kind of firm-specific assets that might produce a
competitive advantage in power generation. Given the high levels of merger
and acquisition activity in the sector, is is probable that unsuccessful genera-
tors i.e. those that have failed to develop a suﬃciently distinct specific-asset
portfolio to give them a long-run competitive advantage will have ceased to
exist as independent entities. A positive relationship between firm size and
the extent of a firm’s specific assets is likely.
If multinationality is the result of a strategy to achieve growth by a firm
with constrained growth opportunites in their domestic market, either as a
result of an existing large share of domestic capacity or because their coun-
try of origin is small, then multinationality and firm size are likely to be
correlated. Some evidence to support this hypothesis was presented in sec-
tion 4.3 However, given that equation (4.3) shows NM to be a component
of FMSIZE there is a problem of two way causality since ceteris paribus,
an increased in NM will lead to an increase in FMSIZE. Fortunately this
problem may be resolved by including not FMSIZE itself as an explana-
tory variable, but rather its components NATS and CS. A firm that faces
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domestic constraints to growth due to a large share of capacity in its home
market may have no option but to pursue a multinational growth strategy, so
a positive relationship between the probability of multinationality and CS is
expected. This is likely to be emphasised if the country size NATS is small.
The sign on NATS is rather more diﬃcult to predict since firms from small
countries may not have the specific assets that are prerequisites for making
the multinational choice even if they have a large share of domestic capacity,
for example the ability to coordinate across markets.
4.5.2 Country level variables
The regulation of the energy sector in Europe can be loosely divided into
three phases. The first phase was 1989–1997 when regulators formally began
co-operation as the advantages of taking a European perspective on energy
regulation became apparent. The second phase was 1998 and 2003; during
this time the regulatory framework of EU energy policy was established.
Finally, the period since 2004 can be characterised as a period of consolidation
and perhaps the “re-invention” of European energy regulation (Vasconcelos,
2009, p.4) as a new political approach to energy regulation emerges. Though
many member states had already adopted independent regulation voluntarily,
legislation was approved in 2003 that institutionalized independent regulation
at the member state level.
It is highly likely that the presence of a sector specific regulator will af-
fect firms’ strategic choices. Furthermore, given the technical nature of the
power sector and the extent to which the sector is politicized (Mez, 2003) or
at the very least the extent to which it has been subject to high levels of state
involvement (Pollitt, 1999), the level of experience of the regulator is likely
to be related to their eﬀectiveness at constraining limitless domestic growth.
REGY EARS captures both the existence of an independent regulator and
the extent of their experience. However it is diﬃcult to sign a priori be-
cause countering the hypothesis that more experienced regulators are more
eﬀective, is the notion of regulatory capture. That is to say, the possibil-
ity that after some years building relationships and experience of working
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with the regulator, firms become more adept at manipulating the regulatory
system. This then suggests a negative relationship between multinationality
and regulation.
While sector level influences are irrelevant since this is a sector specific
study, characteristics specific to countries like natural resource endowment
and terrain as well as the availability (or otherwise) of inter-connector ca-
pacity to facilitate cross-border trade may influence costs and firm strategy.
A set of country dummies was included in an early version of the model to
test the eﬀect of these and other country-specific factors on multinationality.
However collinearity aﬄicted 5 of the 24 country dummies in step one, and
18 in step two, and parameter estimates are not reported.
4.5.3 Regional level variables
Finally, the analysis in section 4.3 suggested that characteristics of the re-
gion may influence multinationality. The European Regulators Group for
Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) Regional Initiatives (RI) were launched in
2006 with the objective of speeding up integration between markets. The
definition of the seven regions5 was based on shared characteristics, physical
flows, the compatibility of for example, rules pertaining to the allocation of
inter-connector capacity and participation in power exchanges like NordPool
and the European Energy Exchange (EEX). In order to capture regionally
derived influences on multinationality, a set of dummy variables was created
that capture all firms which own capacity in a given RI. It was not possible to
predict the sign on the regional dummies. The full model is therefore given
by:
Multinationality = f(NATS, CS, REGYEARS, REGIONAL DUMMIES)
5Baltic: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Central East : Austria, Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; Central West : Belgium, Germany, France, Nether-
lands; Central South: Austria, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Slovenia; Northern: Ger-
many, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden; South West : Spain, France, Portugal.
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4.6 Estimation procedure and results
Several econometric approaches were considered and experimented with. A
natural choice would be a two-part or hurdle model in which part one gen-
erates the probability of an event occurring, usually using a probit or logit
model, and part two uses linear regression to estimate the eﬀect of the covari-
ates on the size of the dependent variable. Hurdle models allow covariates
to have a diﬀerent eﬀects in each part of the model and for that reason are
attractive. However, a potential restriction on the model is that the two
parts of the model are assumed to be independent. If in fact firms that
are multinational are not randomly selected from the population, then the
second stage results will suﬀer from selection bias.
To overcome this potential problem, a Heckman bivariate sample-selection
model which allows for the possibility that the two parts of the model are
not independent was chosen.
4.6.1 Econometric model structure and assumptions6
Let y∗2 denote the outcome of interest
7. A second latent variable is denoted
by y∗1 and the outcome y
∗
2 is observed if y
∗
1 > 0. In this case, y
∗
1 determines
whether or not the firm is multinational, and y∗2 determines the extent of
multinationality and y∗1 ￿= y∗2.
The two-equation model consists of a selection equation for y1, where
y1 =
1 if y∗1 > 0
0 if y∗1 ≤ 0
and the outcome equation for y2, where
y2 =
y∗2 if y
∗
1 > 0
− if y∗1 ≤ 0
6This section draws extensively on StataCorp (2007, p.561-563) and Cameron and
Trivedi (2009, p.545-546)
7Throughout this section an asterisk denotes a latent variable.
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In this set up, y2 is observed only when y
∗
1 > 0.
Regression estimates using the inverse Mills’ ratio, or nonselection hazard
(Heckman, 1979) give initial values for maximum likelihood estimation. The
regression equation is
y = xjβ + u1j (4.4)
and the selection equation is
zjγ + u2j > 0 (4.5)
where u1 ∼ N(0,σ), u2 ∼ N(0, 1) and corr(u1, u2) = ρ.
The log likelihood for observation j, lnLj = lj is
lj =
wjlnΦ{
zγ+(yj−xjβ)ρ/σ)√
1−ρ2 }− wjln(
√
2πσ) yj observed
wjlnΦ(−zjγ) yj not observed
where Φ() is the standard cumulative normal and wj is an optional weight
for observation j.
Two-step estmitates are computed using Heckman’s (1979) procedure as
follows. First, probit estimates of the selection equation (4.5) are obtained:
Pr(yj observed | zj) = Φ(zjγ)
Next Heckman’s inverse Mills’ ratiomj, also know as the nonselection hazard,
is computed for each observation as:
mj =
φ(zj γˆ)
Φ(zj γˆ)
where φ is the normal density. Also define
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δj = mj(mj + γˆzj)
Following Heckman, the two-step parameter estimates of β are obtained
by augmenting the regression equation with the inverse Mills’ ratiom. There-
fore the regressors become [Xm] and an additional parameter βm on the
variable containing the inverse Mills’ ratio is obtained.
A consistent estimate of the regression disturbance variance is obtained
using the residuals from the augmented regression and the parameter esti-
mate on the inverse Mills’ ratio,
σˆ2 =
e￿e+ β2m
￿N
j=1 δj
N
The two-step estimate of ρ is then
ρˆ =
βm
σˆ
Heckman derived consistent estimates of the coeﬃcient covariance matrix
on the basis of the augmented regression.
LetW = [Xm] and R be a square diagonal matrix of dimension N , with
(1− ˆrho2δj) as the diagonal elements. The conventional VCE is
Vtwostep = σˆ
2(W￿W)−1(W￿RW +Q)(W￿W)−1)
where
Q = ρˆ2(W￿|bfDZ)Vp(Z￿DW)
whereD is the square diagonal matrix of dimension N with δj as the diagonal
elements, Z is the data matrix of selection equation covariates, and Vp is
95
the variance-covariance estimate from the probit estimate of the selection
equation.
4.6.2 Econometric results
For ease of reference and clarity of presentation, results from fitting the model
have been split into two tables. Table 4.5 reports estimates from stage one
of the model with the binary dependent variable MNAT . Estimates of the
extent of firm multinationality, NM conditional on MNAT = 1 in the first
stage are presented in table 4.6. The full data set was a panel covering the
54 firms in 25 countries, over 10 years. After delection of observations due
to missing values, step one of the model was estimated on 517 observations,
and step two on the remaining 125 uncensored observations. Four equations
were estimated. The first two identify the eﬀect of decomposing FMSIZE
into its components parts NATS and CS. The third equation introduces
the variable REGY EARS to test for the eﬀect not just of the presence of
an independent regulator, but of the level of experience of the regulator, on
multinationality. Finally, equation 4 includes a set of dummy variables to
capture potential regional eﬀects. Test statistics are reported at the bottom
of table 4.6.
It is possible that NM and CS are jointly determined. Imagine a firm
with a high CS in its domestic market and that has under utilized resources
so seeks a growth opportunity. The firm goes multinational and initially their
CS will fall because it is firm share weighted by all the countries in which it
is active. However, if the firm expands into an increasing number of markets
causing NM to rise and shares in each active country rise, CS may again
increase. Potential joint determination of NM and CS was tested for by
substituting CS for SHAREHOME, the proportion of domestic capacity
owned by the firm in the selection and regression equations. The estimated
coeﬃcients on the explanatory variables were barely aﬀected. Therefore CS
was retained as the preferred measure of country share: not only does break-
ing firm size into its component parts overcome the problem of correlation
between FMSIZE and NM discussed in section 4.5 but that it is amenable
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to the decomposition is also attractive.
Decomposing FMSIZE into its constituent parts yields interesting in-
sights. Firms from larger countries (NATS) are more likely to go multi-
national and markedly less likely to be extensively multinational than firms
with a large typical country share (CS), though the latter eﬀect becomes
significant only in the final equation in which regional dummies are included.
Typical country size is therefore quantitatively more important than typical
country share as a determinant of both the decision to go multinational and
the extent of multinationality. This is not inconsistent with the evidence pre-
sented in section 4.3 that firms from large member states develop a general
co-ordinating capacity that make multinationality more likely, though a large
national size in itself does not seem to equip or incentivise firms to be highly
multinational. Conversely, monopolists and firms with a large country share
seem to suﬀer from inertia, which is perhaps surprising given the large num-
ber of profitable opportunities that have occurred over the period as many
countries have privatized their generation sectors either totally or partially.
On the other hand, it is possibly that in contrast to firms from large member
states, those with large shares are not required to develop coordination skills.
Or perhaps Hicks (1935, p.8) was indeed correct in his conjecture “The best
of all monopoly profits is a quiet life”, which presumably precludes going to
the eﬀort of profit maximizing.
Firms originating in countries where the years of experience of the inde-
pendent regulator REGY EARS is high are slightly more likely to be multi-
national and similarly firms from these countries are also somewhat more
likely to be intensively multinational. These results provide some weak evi-
dence against the notion of regulatory capture. Strict regulation by a national
regulator is likely to influence the direction of firm growth. It is plausible
that the combination of an experienced regulator and a large country share
might have a positive eﬀect on multinationality. An interaction term for
REGY EARS and CS was generated, but it was not significant and added
little to the model so is not reported here. Similarly an equation which in-
cluded a set of dummy variables intended to capture country specific eﬀects
was estimated, but the dummies were seriously aﬀected by collinearity so the
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results are not reported.
Finally, data on multinationality by country of origin that was presented
and discussed in section 4.3 suggested that there may be some regional eﬀects
operating and to control for this possibility regional dummies were included in
the model. The most striking eﬀect of the inclusion of the regional dummies
is on the overall fit of the model8. The Wald chi2 statistic and the associated
p values for equations 1 – 3 means that hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on
each of the variables is equal to zero, cannot be rejected. The explanatory
power of the model is very limited indeed. By contrast for equation 4, the
Wald chi2 statistic with p = 0.000 leads to an emphatic rejection of this
hypothesis.
The individual coeﬃcients on the regional dummies refer to comparisons
with Baltic, the region omitted from the analysis. In the selection stage, firms
operating in Central East were less likely than those operating in Baltic to
be multinational, while those owning capacity in Central West, Northern
and South West were significantly more likely to be multinational and those
operating in Central South shared a similar propensity to be multinational
with Baltic. Concerning the extent of multinationality, only firms owning
capacity in Central South and Northern are significantly more likely to be
more intensely multinational than those owning capacity in Baltic.
There appear to be important factors operating at the regional level but
that are not explained by diﬀerences in the sizes of countries, the share of
firms in domestic systems or the level of experience of the regulator. Potential
factors include ease of communication, and common dispatch and trading
rules. But another candidate is derived from the literature. In defining
their RIs, ERGEG took note of shared practices, physical flows and trading
platforms among other things, which suggests, unsurprisingly, that there is
greater homogeneity among firms within regions than within the EU taken
as a whole. It was shown above that firms with multiplant operations in
the USA were more likely to expand into Canada (Caves, 1974) and the
8Interestingly, this large eﬀect of the inclusion of dummies on the fit of the model is
also found in earlier work of this type (Davies and Lyons, 1996) though in their case the
eﬀect was produced by country dummies.
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situation seems analogous. RIs might serve to facilitate the formation of
eﬀective strategic groups, which are associated with more easily sustained
collusion.
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Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −2·234 ∗ ∗∗ −2·731 ∗ ∗∗ 2·874 ∗ ∗∗ −3·084 ∗ ∗∗
(0·15) (0·28) (0·30) (0·44)
FMSIZE 0·844 ∗ ∗∗
(0·172)
NATS 0·888 ∗ ∗∗ 0·909 ∗ ∗∗ 0·796 ∗ ∗∗
(0·09) (0·093) (0·14)
CS 0·550 ∗ ∗∗ 0·559 ∗ ∗∗ 0·568 ∗ ∗∗
(0·07) (0·07) (0·09)
REGYEARS 0·028 0·048∗
(0·02) (0·024)
CENTRALEAST −0·579∗
(0·25)
CENTRALWEST 1·392 ∗ ∗∗
(0·24)
CENTRALSOUTH −0·202
(0·24)
NORTHERN 0·684 ∗ ∗∗
(0·19)
SOUTHWEST 1·839 ∗ ∗∗
(0·25)
Heckman two-step selection model, stage one: selection equation.
Dependent variable MNAT = 1 if firm is multinational, 0 otherwise. Variables FMSIZE, NATS and CS were
estimated in log form.
Total number of observations = 517, censored observations = 392, uncensored observations = 125
Table 4.5: Results of stage one: the multinational decision.
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Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0·796 2·286 2·092 0·621∗
(0·77) (1·51) (1·43) (0·31)
FMSIZE −0·063
(0·156)
NATS −0·433 −0·391 −0·195 ∗ ∗∗
(0·33) (0·31) (0·06)
CS −0·276 −0·253 −0·124 ∗ ∗
(0·22) (0·21) (0·04)
REGYEARS 0·005 0·031 ∗ ∗
(0·01) (0·01)
CENTRALEAST −0·080
(0·25)
CENTRALWEST 0·086
(0·11)
CENTRALSOUTH 0·355 ∗ ∗∗
(0·10)
NORTHERN 0·333 ∗ ∗
(0·10)
SOUTHWEST 0·129
(0·14)
Mills −0·193 −0·605 −0·553 −0·049
(0·29) (0·58) (0·54) (0·11)
Test statistics
Wald χ2 0·16 1·70 3·71 63·26
P value 0·685 0·428 0·294 0·00
Heckman two-step selection model, stage two: regression equation.
Dependent variable log NM . Variables FMSIZE, NATS and CS estimated in log form.
Total observations = 517, censored = 392, uncensored = 125
Table 4.6: Results of stage two: the extent of firm multinationality.
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4.7 Conclusion and discussion
The focus of this chapter has been the detailed analysis of one particular
element of firm strategy, firm multinationality. Two separate questions are
addressed: is the firm multinational? if so, how multinational are they?
Preliminary descriptive statistical analysis suggested broad associations. On
the face of it, large firms appear to follow a more multinational strategy
than small ones. Firm nationality appears to be important to some extent
– Swedish and French firms are the ‘most multinational’ throughout the pe-
riod, and German firms rise from almost the bottom of the ‘multinationality
ranking’ of countries in 1998 to third position in 2007. Evidence that firms
from the larger member states tend to be more intensively multinational is
rather mixed, though there is some suggestion that regional influences on
multinationality may be important. Formerly communist states have a par-
ticularly low incidence of multinationality. However none of these findings is
particularly surprising given the historical context of the sector.
However by decomposing firm size into its constituent components, typi-
cal country share and typical national size, and by controlling for the regu-
latory regime and possible regional eﬀects, a more comprehensive and telling
story about how firms have responded to market liberalization has been de-
veloped. Considering first the decision to go multinational. The typical size
of member state in which the firm operates has a stronger influence than the
typical share of national capacity owned by the firm on the multinational
decision. As suggested by specific-assets theories of the MNE, a general abil-
ity to organize operations across markets is important. For example, a firm
based in Germany, which has a relatively fragmented market structure, may
be forced develop this ability in order to operate successfully at home, which
puts them at an advantage relative to a monopolist when it comes to interna-
tional expansion. The market power theory of the MNE predicts that firms
dominant in their home market but that have reached the limits to domestic
expansion seek to increase profit by extending market power across countries.
If this were the case, then we would expect typical market share to dominate
typical country size. The specific assets theory then seems to be more consis-
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tent with the present analysis. However an alternative interpretation drawn
from multimarket contact theory recognises the likelihood that firms operat-
ing within a (large) national market are likely to meet rivals more often in
domestic markets and to recognize the interdependency which is critical to
the maintenance of collusive behaviour (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
Typical national size does not appear to confer the kind of advantage
that leads to the intensification of multinationality, indeed the two are neg-
atively correlated. Firms operating in large countries are less likely to be
highly multinational than those operating in small countries. In a market
power framework, this result is consistent with a multimarket contact story
that since firms operating in large countries are in regular contact with ri-
vals, they have an enhanced ability to sustain collusive behaviour without
having to resort to intensive multinationality. Typical country share is also
negatively correlated with intense multinationality, so monopolists are not
highly multinational. This is not consistent with the market power theory of
the MNE, though it is consistent with the theory that firms are influenced
by the behaviour of their rivals and the membership of strategic groups. A
monopolist does not have rivals.
These results may also suggest that the two decisions are independent,
which takes us back to the motive for going multinational in the first place.
Why would a firm go multinational but then halt the process? Perhaps the
influence of the firms that they see as their rivals is important? If that is
the case, then as discussed above, this may be evidence of the formation of
relatively symmetric strategic groups which can be expected to ‘improve’ the
conditions for collusive strategies.
Evidence has been presented showing that since market liberalization,
the multinational strategies adopted by generators have changed. That is
to say, the behaviour of the firms has materially altered the structure of
the market. The new conditions may be more conducive to an increased
likelihood of collusive behaviour, though this study presents no evidence at all
that collusive behaviour has taken place, it suggests one possible explanation
of the observed change in strategy.
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CHAPTER
FIVE
INTER-FIRM AND INTRA-FIRM DIFFUSION OF
CLEAN GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES: THE
CASE OF WIND
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the adoption process and patterns of use
of a particular clean power generation technology, wind turbine generators
(WTG). Technological change 1 in large measure determines the development
path of industrial societies (Grashof et al., 1999). There is therefore a direct
link between technological change and social welfare. Despite a longstanding
recognition that social benefits are fully realized only when new technologies
are widely adopted or diﬀused throughout the economy (Fudenberg and Ti-
role, 1985) the vast majority of academic research has focussed on one of two
themes. First, the analysis of innovation in which the distinction between
the diﬀerent stages of technological change2 is not drawn (e.g. Geroski, 2000,
Gilbert, 2006). The second major theme concerns R&D – the invention of
1Throughout this chapter the terms technological change and innovation are synony-
mous.
2Invention, the creation of new ideas and knowledge, R&D, the introduction of new
methods or knowledge, and finally diﬀusion when the new technology is adopted on a
widespread basis (Schumpeter, 1942)
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new ideas (e.g. Braun et al., 2010). Despite its clear importance, the analysis
of diﬀusion is under developed (Hall, 2004).
There are two aspects of diﬀusion; the number of firms using the tech-
nology, or inter-firm diﬀusion, and the share of the firm’s capacity (or equiv-
alently, production) accounted for by the new technology, or intra-firm dif-
fusion. The limited research eﬀort devoted to diﬀusion has concentrated on
inter-firm diﬀusion where much progress has been made through both theo-
retical and empirical analysis since the seminal early work of Griliches (1957)
and Mansfield (1963b). Mansfield (1963a) was the first to explore intra-firm
diﬀusion empirically, and proposed the possibility that the same factors may
determine both types of diﬀusion. Until recently intra-firm diﬀusion has
remained a largely neglected topic.
Public support for potentially costly policy interventions that support
technological change is at least implicitly based on the perception that it
is driven by scientific discoveries. However, if as Schmookler argued, new
technologies emerge in response to “the recognition of a costly problem to
be solved or a potentially profitable opportunity to be seized” (Schmookler,
1966, p.199), then the adoption of new process technologies can be considered
as a consequence of dynamic competition (Sidak and Teece, 2009). Indeed
Schmookler’s recognition of the strategic importance of innovation to firms
appears to be consistent with the prevailing opinion in at least one important
industrial sector. In a recent survey, the leaders of global utility firms report
the view that “technology will be central to future growth and competitive
advantage” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009, p.3).
Power generation is the largest single contributor to greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Solomon, 2007) so the sector has a responsibility to make large emis-
sions reductions. Furthermore, clean technologies are a major emerging
global business (Pew, 2010) that presents opportunities for growth. Prior
to the 2008 economic downturn, the EU experienced an extended period in
which investment in generation capacity was low while demand for electricity
increased. This has proved an uncomfortable combination given the planned
plant retirements due to, for example the Large Plant Directive. The emer-
gence of supply gaps in EU member states is a real prospect, and accordingly,
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83% of respondents to the PricewaterhouseCoopers survey claim that their
competitive strategy includes making large or medium investments in gener-
ation capacity.
However, it is not clear which technologies the utilities will invest in.
Aghion et al. (2009) has recently argued that public interventions in the
market are needed to mobilize the private investment that can ensure that
today’s investment decisions result in a future technology portfolio consis-
tent with a sustainable economy. Such interventions must be made on the
basis of a sound body of evidence, but unfortunately the academic analysis
of innovation in power generation reflects the dominant approaches outlined
above. In particular, the literature focusing on the diﬀusion of low carbon
technologies for power generation is very limited though there are two recent
examples: Diaz-Rainey (2010) considers the diﬀusion of wind turbines across
EU member states when diﬀusion is induced by interventions such as support
mechanisms or targets, and a recent empirical study of the diﬀusion of envi-
ronment related technologies based on patent data finds that the absorptive
capacity of recipient countries is a deterministic factor in technology transfer
(Glachant et al., 2009). In common with the remainder of the literature,
these two studies deal with patterns of aggregate diﬀusion among countries.
The absence of empirical research on the diﬀusion of low-carbon technolo-
gies at the firm level is important for at least four reasons. First, aggregate
diﬀusion and the implied emissions reductions associated with substituting
conventional generation technologies for low carbon technologies is a func-
tion of both the number of firms that adopt the technology and the intensity
with which they use it. Second, these outcomes are primarily the result of in-
vestment decisions made by firms not governments. Third, existing research
suggests that the decision to adopt a new technology is independent of the
decision to intensify use of it (Battisti and Stoneman, 2003, Hollenstein and
Woerter, 2008), which means that interventions which have the eﬀect of in-
creasing the number of users may have little impact on the overall use of the
technology. Finally, costly interventions intended to increase the penetration
of clean technologies should be precisely targeted if they are to meet their
objectives and command public support. Grubb (1997) showed that diﬀusion
106
can be induced by policy: a refined analysis that considers individual firm
behaviour would make a solid basis for policy formation.
The objectives of this study are three fold. First, to find out if we can
map certain firm specific characteristics to a particular intensity of use of
WTG. Given the growing evidence base regarding the anthropogenic nature
of climate change, and the emphasis on innovation as a major part of the
solution (Pew, 2010), this may have important policy implications. Second,
to demonstrate the importance of decomposing aggregate diﬀusion into its
constituent parts based on an application to the diﬀusion of wind turbine
generators (WTG) among leading generators based in the EU. The third
objective is methodological. The volume of literature on intra-firm diﬀusion,
and particularly on the joint modelling of inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion
is miniscule, and there remain a number of methodological challenges to
overcome.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. The discussion above
suggests that public policy is a driver of investment in low carbon technolo-
gies. The purpose of this chapter is to examine firm level factors aﬀecting
diﬀusion, therefore a brief discussion of policy which provides some context
is covered in the following section. An overview of the relevant literature is
discussed in section 5.3, then in sections 5.4 and 5.5 the data is described and
patterns of adoption of wind turbines across and within firms and the indus-
try are analyzed. In section 5.6 a model of diﬀusion is developed and the
econometric methodology specified. Results are presented and discussed in
section 5.7. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter with a discussion of potential
policy implications and the next steps for the research.
5.2 Policy options for the diﬀusion of low car-
bon technologies
Potential market failures which aﬀect technology diﬀusion are numerous,
and include imperfect information, market structure in both the supplying
and adopting industries, and externalities which may lead to, for example,
107
first mover advantages (see Stoneman and Diederen, 1994). The uncertainty
and risk implied by all these factors change the relative costs and benefits
of adoption in a complex and interrelated way, and mean that the market
alone is likely to underinvest in low carbon technologies relative to the social
optimum, and potentially justify the provision of subsidies. Diﬀusion policy
is, therefore far from straightforward, and this is not the place for a detailed
analysis.
However, to get a feel for the kind of instruments currently in use and
which influence the diﬀusion of low carbon technologies, we briefly discuss
and contrast two alternative policy choices intended to reduce risk and un-
certainty through subsidies. There is an inherent risk associated with new
and unproven technologies - how much are the costs likely to fall and over
what period? what is the option value of waiting? how will the technology
fit with my existing portfolio? Will the supplying firm provide eﬀective after
sales service? A second problem for investors relates to policy uncertainty
when the asset life of generation technologies varies, between say 20 and 60
years. Even taking the lower end of the spectrum, this is significantly shorter
than the political cycle. If policy makers are unable to credibly commit to
long term policies, policy risk is introduced. How does a potential investor in
a project know whether or not after say, 5 years, a policy oﬀering a subsidy
that makes a specific project commercially viable today, will in years to come
be altered and render the project unprofitable? The high capital intensity of
renewable energy projects only serves to enhance downside risks.
Subsidies are implemented in either a quantity or price setting frame-
work. For example, the policy may mandate generators to produce a certain
proportion of their output from renewable sources, the so-called portfolio
standards approach that is becoming dominant in the USA. These quantity
based systems generally rely on tradeable certificates, and their key advan-
tage is that firms enjoy flexibility with respect to decisions on how to meet
the target. However, the success of these schemes depends critically on the
credibility of the punishment mechanism if firms fail to meet the targets.
By contrast, price setting frameworks are typified by the feed-in-tariﬀ
systems which are prevalent in the EU, e.g. Germany and Spain. In this
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framework, investor risk is reduced by a per-unit subsidy paid to renewable
generation, in addition to the standard power price. Feed-in-tariﬀ systems
are considered to be both predictable and flexible: they can be tapered to
reflect expected falls in the cost of the technology, and can be specified for
the lifespan of the project. However, critics argue that they can be more
expensive than quantity based systems, and force policy makers to make
decisions regarding which technologies to support, and at what level.
EU member states have adopted a patchwork of policies with respect to
investment in low carbon technologies, and since e.g, Grubb (1997) has shown
that policy may induce diﬀusion, it follows that the diﬀerent policy regimes
among member states in part drive diﬀerent adoption patterns. However,
since the focus of this chapter is the adoption behaviour at the aggregate firm
level, the eﬀect of policy diﬀerences between member states is diminished.
To see why, consider two member states, A and B. Given member state based
policies, all firms wishing to invest in renewables in member state A will face
the same policy environment, and the same for those wishing to invest in
member state B. Therefore the firm level approach is well suited to analysis
that seeks to abstract from country level variables, for example policy regime,
in order to build up a picture of firm behaviour.
5.3 Literature
It is striking that with few exceptions, diﬀusion has been studied from either
the perspective of inter-firm diﬀusion, or intra-firm diﬀusion. This may not
matter if the new technology instantly displaces the old technology, but the
reality is often diﬀerent. In these cases a deeper understanding may be gained
by decomposing overall or aggregate diﬀusion into its component parts. In
this section the related literatures on inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion are
discussed, and the nascent literature that concerns the simultaneous analysis
of inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion considered.
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5.3.1 Disequilibrium models of inter-firm diﬀusion
The models discussed in this section are disequilibrium models in the sense
that the diﬀusion path reflects a series of disequilibrium positions as the
level of diﬀusion adjusts to an equilibrium some time in the future. Griliches
(1957) was the pioneer of the basic disequilibrium model3 in which the ob-
served variation in rates of diﬀusion among firms is driven by the spread of
information. Griliches’ (ibid.) key finding was that the profitability of the
innovation is the main driver of the ‘rate of acceptance’. Another early study
based on a disequilibrium model Mansfield (1963b) explores the eﬀect of firm
size and the ex-post profitability of adoption on inter-firm diﬀusion. Larger
firms adopted faster than smaller firms, and a positive relationship between
speed of adoption and expected increases in profit (due to the innovation)
was found.
Epidemic models are capable of generating the logistic diﬀusion curve
that appears to describe the diﬀusion of new technologies well, but crucial
enabling assumptions are not necessarily justifiable (Davies, 1979, p.11-12).
In particular, the assumptions that potential adopters are homogenous and
that the pace of adoption is constant seem highly unrealistic, and Davies
argues that the superficially impressive correlation coeﬃcients generated by
these models conceal underlying econometric problems, making them less
convincing than they first appear. Furthermore, they are unable to explain
the emergence of new technologies. This is an important limitation if, for
example, we are relying on technological change as a key component of the
fight against climate change. A consensus has developed: epidemic models of
diﬀusion have generated important insights into the diﬀusion process and a
framework for ongoing research, but on their own cannot provide a detailed
picture of the drivers of the diﬀusion process.
5.3.2 Equilibrium models of inter-firm diﬀusion
In equilibrium models the diﬀusion path is traced out between shifting equi-
libria. Theoretical advances have yielded three analytical approaches to the
3Also known as epidemic models.
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study of diﬀusion that rely on less restrictive assumptions than those of dis-
equilibrium models. By contrast to disequilibrium models where diﬀusion is
a self-propagating process, the diﬀusion path in equilibrium models is driven
by variation in the costs and payoﬀs to adoption among firms.
The first set of models assume a heterogenous population of potential
adopters, and that the cost of the technology falls over time. Firm hetero-
geneity generates a ranking of potential adopters, and the diﬀusion path is
determined as costs fall and firms expecting high returns invest before rivals
with lower expectations.
The first models capable of explaining the role of firm-specific factors
in the speed of diﬀusion were David (1969) and Davies (1979). Potential
adopters are assumed to have full information regarding the existence of
the technology, which is assumed to experience falling costs as a result of
learning. Firms diﬀer in their attitude to risk and in their ability to ‘absorb’
the innovation, and have divergent expectations regarding the profitability of
the technology. Davies (1979) finds diﬀusion to be faster when the innovation
is more profitable, the adopting firm has a small number of rivals and size
inequalities between firms are small.
An alternative approach rests on two additional assumptions which aﬀect
the balance of costs and benefits accruing to the adopter (e.g. Reinganum,
1981, Quirmbach, 1986). First, the profitability of adoption is positively re-
lated to increased use of the technology by rival firms. There are positive
spillovers. Second, as the accumulated stock of the technology rises, so pro-
duction costs fall, which in turn drives adoption. Firm heterogeneity does
not enter these models so they are not capable of predicting which types of
firms will be early adopters. However they do imply an inverse relationship
between the number of adopters and the benefits from adoption, and so point
to the possibility of first mover advantages.
Closely related are models where the ordering of the payoﬀs to adoption
causes competition for first mover advantages and thus the diﬀusion path up
to the point where the marginal firm is indiﬀerent. Diﬀusion only continues
past this point if the costs of adoption decline (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole,
1985).
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5.3.3 Intra-firm diﬀusion
There is very little literature concerning intra-firm diﬀusion although it is at
least as important to understand diﬀusion processes within the firm as it is
to understand how diﬀusion spreads among firms. The first intra-firm study
was Mansfield’s seminal paper which explored the possibility that factors
found to influence the speed of adoption, may also determine the speed of
substitution between the old and new technologies within the firm (Mansfield,
1963a). The time interval since the appearance of the technique was found
to be positively correlated with the speed with which firms intensified their
use of the new technology. Mansfield’s analysis of intra-firm diﬀusion was
important for the development of more nuanced models in two respects. It
was the first attempt to apply the inter-firm model to intra-firm diﬀusion,
and second, by identifying firm liquidity and the expected profitability of
the invention, it was the forerunner of models that recognize the role of
firm heterogeneity as a driver of diﬀerential rates of adoption. However,
Mansfield’s intra-firm study is a disequilibrium model, so suﬀers from the
deficiencies outlined in the preceding section.
There was then a long period during which intra-firm diﬀusion was appar-
ently totally neglected by academic researchers. But more recently empirical
analysis examining the determinants of diﬀusion within the firm have be-
gun to emerge (e.g. Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 2001, Fuentelsaz et al., 2003,
A˚stebro, 2004) though empirical evidence remains thin.
5.3.4 Joint modelling of inter-firm and intra-firm dif-
fusion
Even rarer are studies which jointly analyze inter-firm and intra firm diﬀu-
sion. Battisti et al. (2004) develop an encompassing model which hypoth-
esizes that eﬀects that have been shown to determine diﬀusion patterns in
inter-firm models, also drive diﬀusion within the firm. Battisti et al. (2007)
apply the encompassing model to the diﬀusion of information technology
within and across countries, and find that the first adoption decision is not a
direct determinant of the current intensity of use. Furthermore, the epidemic-
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type eﬀects incorporated in Mansfield’s studies (1963a, 1963b) were not found
to be valuable in explaining diﬀerences in intra-firm diﬀusion patterns.
5.4 Definitions and data
For the sake of clarity, four terms used throughout the chapter to denote
specific aspects of diﬀusion at a given time t are defined as follows:
5.4.1 Defining diﬀusion
Inter-firm diﬀusion is the cumulative number of adopters as a proportion
of the number of firms in the sample.
Intra-firm diﬀusion for is the proportion of each firm’s total global in-
stalled capacity accounted for by wind turbines.
Aggregate diﬀusion is the product of inter and intra-firm diﬀusion, and
measures diﬀusion across the industry.
An Adopter is a firm which reports generating electric power from wind
turbines.
5.4.2 Data
There is no compelling reason for firms in most industries to report their
technology mix4 so the availability of data that could be used to measure
inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion is low. However firms take corporate so-
cial responsibility very seriously and corporations operating in a variety of
sectors have responded to heightened public and political concerns over cli-
mate change by publicizing their green credentials, e.g. in 2007 Marks and
Spencer launched their ‘Plan A’ aimed at combatting global climate change,
and have advertised it extensively. Figure 5.1 shows that in 2010 energy
4The technology mix, or equivalently in this study, the capacity mix, is the combination
of plant types used in production. For example, 50% nuclear reactors, 30% coal fired power
stations and 20% hydro.
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industries account for approximately one third of total greenhouse gas emis-
sions (GHG) emissions of the EU-27, the bulk of which comes from power
generation. Therefore generators have a particularly strong motive to publish
information about how ‘green’ their generation mix is.
Figure 5.1: GHG emissions by sector, EU–27. 2010
Source:Eurostat
Inter-firm diﬀusion curves are generated by the time path of the date of
first adoption. The date of first adoption for each firm was inferred from the
technology mix reported in company reports. So for example, if company A
reported generating power using coal, oil and gas in year 1, but in year 2 the
mix included WTG, then they would be classified as having adopted WTG in
year 2. Archives of company reports lodged on websites are generally limited
to a maximum of 10 – 12 years, so the adoption date of early adopters,
for example Nuon (Netherlands) and DEI (Greece) was obtained by direct
communication with the firm concerned.
Estimates of intra-firm diﬀusion of WTG are based on detailed knowledge
of the proportion of the capacity mix accounted for by each technology. While
for recent years most (but not) all generators report this information in
their annual or environmental reports, the data was very patchy prior to
about 2005. Since firm heterogeneity has been shown to be an important
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driver of diﬀusion, data on specific firm characteristics was required. However
obtaining detailed data over several years would have entailed sending out
a questionnaire to each firm, and resources for large scale data collection
were unavailable. Therefore data on firm specific characteristics for a single
year, 2008, was collected from firm annual reports. Diﬀusion is an inherently
dynamic process so while not ideal, this is the approach adopted in most
other studies of intra-firm diﬀusion (Battisti et al., 2007, Hollenstein and
Woerter, 2008, e.g.), with the notable exception of Fuentelsaz et al. (2003).
5.4.3 The sample firms
The sample firms are all generators that are leading firms in their country of
origin as presented in the market share matrix for power generation presented
in chapter 25. Of the 54 matrix firms, 15 failed to supply data despite
repeated requests, so the sample consists of 39 firms.
5.5 Patterns of diﬀusion of WTG
In this section observed patterns of inter-firm diﬀusion and intra-firm diﬀu-
sion among adopting firms are evaluated.
5.5.1 Inter-firm diﬀusion
As the ‘California wind rush’ took oﬀ in the 1970s, the first European power
generators began to take an interest in the new technology and to build
demonstration plants. It seems likely that among firms that did eventu-
ally adopt, the time-lag between the firm installing the prototype and first
reporting generation using the technology would vary between firms. Anec-
dotal evidence bore out this suspicion. For example, under the auspices of
their R&D department, Vattenfall committed funding and installed a 70kW
5The unit size of WTG is small relative to more traditional generating technologies,
which means that total wind farm size may be small. There is a multitude of small orga-
nizations such as farms and communities that own their own small wind farm consisting
of a few turbines. The sample does not include such installations since it is the strategy
of large firms that is of interest.
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prototype in 1976, followed by a larger 2MW unit in 19846. But it was only
in 1995 that the first 20 WTG formed part of the Vattenfall capacity mix,
i.e. generated power which was sold commercially. To avoid ambiguity and
imprecision, sample firms were classified as having adopted the technology
only when they first reported generating power from the technology, which
is not necessarily the coincident with the year of first installation.
Figure 5.2: Inter-firm diﬀusion of WTG
Figure 5.2 traces out the time path of WTG adoption between the first
commercial adoption of the technology (1982) and 2008. By the end of 2008,
26 years after the pioneering firm Nuon (then called PEN) of the Netherlands
had adopted WTG, 70% of firms in the sample had reported producing power
with the new technology. Just less than half of the firms in the sample had
also adopted WTG after 18 years. By comparison, Battisti and Stoneman
(2003) find that 82% of firms in the sample had adopted computer numer-
ically controlled machine tools (CNC) 22 years after the first firm adopted.
Based on data for the USA, table 5.1 provides similar information for a va-
riety of process technologies. WTG is a complex, expensive technology and
while none of the technologies mentioned is particularly similar to WTG,
6Source: correspondence with Anders Sjogren at Vattenfall
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Technology Years for half potential adopters to acquire
Industrial robots 12
Numerically controlled machine tools 5
Diesel locomotives 9
Centralised traﬃc control 14
Car retarders 13
Continuous wide strip mill 8
By-product coke oven 15
Continuous annealing 13
Shuttle car 5
Trackless mobile loader 6
Continuous mining machine 3
Tin container 1
High speed bottle filler 6
Pallet loading machine 5
Source: Mansfield (1989)
Table 5.1: Inter-firm diﬀusion of selected technologies.
many are also high cost and complex. The time taken for inter-firm diﬀusion
of WTG to reach 50%, about 18 years, is longer than all the comparators.
Another way to look at the delay in introducing a new technology is with
reference to the number of years that adopting firms wait, measured as the
interval between commercialization7 of the product and adoption. The mean
number of years waited before adoption is 17, and the median 19, so the
data has a slight negative skew. 33% of adopting firms waited between 19
and 22 years to do so, as shown in table 5.2. Overall, the data suggest that
the inter-firm adoption of WTG has taken place at an unusually slow pace
relative to other technologies, though unfortunately comparators from the
power sector are not available because of the dearth of firm-level analysis.
Several factors may have contributed to this lengthy delay (see Kemp
and Volpi, 2008). Technical factors include the complexity of the technology
and hence the scope for post introduction refinements and declining prices,
7Defined here as the first year that a sample firm reported producing power from WTG,
1982.
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Years waited Number of firms % adopting firms
up to 10 3 11
11-14 6 22
15-18 4 15
19-22 9 33
22-26 5 19
Total 27 100
Time elapsed from the year the pioneering firm adopted.
Table 5.2: Time firms waited before adopting WTG.
may induce firms to wait in the expectation of lower prices and ‘learning by
doing’. Institutional factors, including support mechanisms such as feed in
tariﬀs and green certificate schemes change the relative costs and benefits of
adoption, and are intended to induce adoption. But equally, they may delay
adoption in countries that have not implemented support schemes. Therefore
while institutional arrangements cannot explain diﬀerences in the speed of
adoption among firms, given that schemes vary considerably across member
states, firms that do not (or cannot) pursue a multinational strategy, may
be constrained by arrangements in their domestic market. In the presence of
uncertainty about for example, the future cost or level of technology specific
subsidy, waiting may carry an option value (Dixit et al., 1994). Similarly,
resource availability may be important if for example the wind resource in
a given member state is low and domestic generating firms do not follow a
multinational strategy.
The pattern observed in figure 5.2 is consistent with the predictions from
the literature which suggest that inter-firm diﬀusion follows a logistic curve
(Hall, 2004, p.16), and further that typically complex and expensive process
technologies tend to exhibit a cumulative normal curve (Davies, 1979, p.50).
A recent study suggests that diﬀusion induced through policy instruments
may sometimes follow a diﬀerent diﬀusion path, though does not provide
conclusive evidence of its shape (Diaz-Rainey, 2010). Learning aﬀects the
expected cost of adoption, which varies between firms, so the post invention
period for a complex, expensive technology is characterized by a fairly slow
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Category WTG % Number of firms % of firms
Intensive Over 20% 3 11
Low 1 – 20% 17 63
Basic 0.1 – 1% 7 26
Total 27 100
Table 5.3: Intra-firm diﬀusion of WTG, by category.
rate of learning during which suppliers improve and refine the technology
over time which leads to cost reductions. This is represented by the fairly
flat portion of the curve up to about 11 years, after which it starts to increase
more rapidly and interestingly, the rate of growth continues to rise, though
there are possibly the first signs of a decline in the rate of growth at 25 years.
5.5.2 Intra-firm diﬀusion
27 sample firms had adopted WTG by 2008. Following earlier studies, (e.g
Battisti et al., 2007), adopters were categorized according to the proportion
of WTG in their capacity mix; basic adopters for whom WTG remained a
tiny share of their capacity, low level adopters who had between 1% and 20%
WTG and intensive adopters with a WTG share of over 20%. The cut points
dividing the categories, 1% and 20% were derived from visual inspection of
the data, so there is a possibility that a bias is introduced by this ad hoc
classification, however the purpose of proceeding in this way is simply to oﬀer
an approximate characterization of the types of strategy that firms adopted8.
Table 5.3 shows that among adopting firms, 63% firms had a low WTG
share in 2008, and for only 11% firms was WTG an intensive part of their
capacity mix. The mean level of intra-firm diﬀusion is only 5.4%, compared
with, for example, 27% for CNC 22 years after its introduction (Battisti and
Stoneman, 2003). Given that the WTG was first adopted in 1982, the low
proportion of firms using the technology intensively some 26 years later may
have important policy implications, which are addressed in section 5.8.
Two of the three intense adopters, Acciona and Ibedrola, are based in
8The econometric model was estimated on the continuous variable.
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Spain and the third, EDP, in Portugal, and all are multinational. None was
an early adopter, waiting 13, 17 and 19 years respectively as compared to
a mean of 17 years, which confirms that Mansfield’s (1963a) prediction that
the intensity of use of a new technology increases with experience, may not
hold in this case.
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between intra-firm diﬀusion and the
number of years experience the firm has with the technology. Two features
stand out: first, it shows that the for the majority of firms, WTG remains
a very small proportion of the capacity mix; second, for the majority of
firms, the decision to intensify the share of wind in total capacity appears
to be independent of the decision to adopt in the first place, i.e. the wind
share of capacity remains very small many years after the firm adopted the
technology.
Figure 5.3: Intra-firm diﬀusion of WTG, proportionate measure. 2008
Figure 5.49 shows the relationship between the absolute size of WTG
capacity for each firm and their years experience, i.e., it is not weighted by
firm size. Ibedrola (Spain) is the clear leader in terms of installed capacity
9Data points in figures 5.4 and 5.3 are in general labelled if they lie at the extremes
of the plot. Labelling all data points resulted in a figure that is diﬃcult to read.
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with 9 GW. This is an impressive achievement, particularly when it is noted
that Ibedrola was a fairly late adopter. Fellow Iberians EDP (Portugal)
and Acciona (Spain) also have large WTG capacities, and it is tempting
to speculate that the generous renewables support schemes on the Iberian
peninsular may be part of the explanation. This may reflect reality, but
recall that the data is global installed capacity for each firm and only the
capacity installed in domestic markets would attract the relatively high level
of subsidy. At the other extreme lie the early adopters Nuon (Netherlands),
DEI (Greece) and Dong (Denmark) but who by 2008 still had a very small
WTG share.
Figure 5.4: Intra-firm diﬀusion of WTG, absolute measure. 2008
Comparing the two figures is instructive. First, both share similar pat-
terns and there appears to be an upper bound (bottom left to top centre)
which exhibits the expected logistic shape - firms on or close to this upper
bound have invested relatively late and intensified the share of wind in their
total capacity fast relative to other firms. However, the ranking of firms
changes, particularly among those with the higher WTG share. Though
EDP and Ibedrola have a considerably larger WTG share than the remain-
ing firms, Acciona’s share is of a diﬀerent order of magnitude. It is interesting
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to note that while, for example, Enel (Italy) has the fourth largest capac-
ity in absolute terms, the proportion WTG in their overall capacity mix is
among the lowest in the sample. These findings suggest very diﬀerent cor-
porate strategies with respect to wind, and supports the characterization of
firms as basic, low and intense adopters. Finally, both figures imply that
first mover advantages do not exist - the first three adopters have among the
lowest WTG share by either measure.
5.5.3 Aggregate diﬀusion across the industry
To determine whether or not the behaviour of the sample firms was consistent
with that implied by studies examining diﬀusion at the country level10, data
was obtained for the share of wind in overall net electrical capacity by OECD
region for the period 1992 – 2008. Figure 5.5 shows OECD Europe to have
around 7.5% WTG in total capacity, however recall that although sample
firms are all based in the EU, sample capacities are global, so the correct
comparator is OECD total.
Figure 5.5: WTG share of total capacity, OECD regions. 1992–2008
10As discussed above, such studies comprise the vast proportion of literature. (see, for
example Diaz-Rainey, 2010)
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To calculate overall diﬀusion Dt for the sample firms at time t let:
Dt =
Kt
Yt
(5.1)
where Kt =
￿M
i=1 knew is the sum of firms’ installed capacity of the new
technology, and Yt =
￿N
i=1 knew + kold is the sum of firms’ total installed
capacity and where M is the number of adopters and N is the number of
potential adopters.
Average intra-firm diﬀusion is defined as (Kt/Mt)/(Yt/Nt), the average
proportion of the new technology in the installed capacity of adopters, as a
proportion of the average industry installed capacity per firm. Then equa-
tion (5.1) is equivalent to equation (5.2)
Dt =
￿
Mt
Nt
￿￿
Kt/Mt
Yt/Nt
￿
(5.2)
From section 5.4 we know that inter-firm diﬀusion, or the proportion
of firms that had adopted the technology in 2008 was 70%, and calculate
average intra-firm diﬀusion to be 5.4%. Thus using equation (5.2), D2008 is
0.70× 0.054 = 0.038. So 26 years after the technology first appeared, overall
diﬀusion among leading electricity generators is less than 4%.
The sample estimate is therefore consistent with the WTG share in the
OECD data shown in figure 5.5 and the sample appears to be representative
of the industry as a whole. Further, the extent of inter-firm diﬀusion and
intra-firm diﬀusion are vastly diﬀerent, so decomposing overall diﬀusion into
inter and intra-firm diﬀusion is justified.
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5.6 Modelling inter-firm and inter-firm diﬀu-
sion
The modelling of intra-firm diﬀusion is based on the more developed inter-
firm models (see section 5.3). Encompassing models jointly analyze inter-
firm and intra-firm diﬀusion and following Battisti et al. (2004, e.g.) and
Hollenstein and Woerter (2008), is the route taken here.
5.6.1 Empirical model specification
In this section the estimating equation is derived based on the theoretical
and empirical literature.
5.6.2 Dependent variables
Aggregate diﬀusion is the product of two distinct steps. First the firm adopts
the technology, and conditional on that initial adoption, may intensify the
proportion of the technology in their capacity mix. Therefore since we wish to
decompose aggregate diﬀusion into its component parts, two dependent vari-
ables are estimated. The initial decision to adopt the technology is captured
by the variable ADOPTit, which is a binary variable that takes the value 1
if firm i has adopted the technology at time t, and 0 otherwise. The pro-
portion of firm i’s capacity accounted for by WTG is captured by INTRAit .
Because INTRAit is a fractional response variable, it was transformed as
follows. The variable was assumed to be described by the model:
INTRAit =
1
1 + exp(−XB)
where X is the vector of independent variables. Application of the logit
transformation yields:
ln(INTRAit/(1− INTRAit)) = XB
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and the original variable which had been bounded by 0 and 1, is now mapped
to the real line and may be estimated by Least Squares (see Papke and
Wooldridge, 1996).
5.6.3 Independent variables
The set of independent variables included in the estimating equation were de-
rived from the literature discussed in section 5.3 and below, and in particular
Battisti et al. (2007) and Hollenstein and Woerter (2008).
Firm level variables
Firm size, measured by the firm’s total global installed capacity in gigawatts
(GW), SIZE. Existing empirical research has shown that larger firms are
more likely to adopt new technologies (e.g. Davies, 1979, Karshenas and
Stoneman, 1993) though evidence concerning the influence of size on the
intensity of use of new technologies is mixed. Mansfield (1963a) and Battisti
et al. (2004) find the intensification of use of a new technology to be faster
in small firms, but by contrast Battisti and Iona (2009) show that large
firms are more likely to use a set of complementary management practices
more intensively than small firms. Accordingly, it is not possible to predict
the sign of the coeﬃcient ex ante. Preliminary analysis showed firm size
to be strongly positively skewed, therefore a Box-Cox transformation was
performed. Details of the procedure are given in the Appendix.
Firm multinationality. The variable MNAT is the M index that captures
the extent of mulitnationality of multinational firms that was developed in
chapter 4. If the firm’s country of origin is for example, relatively resource
poor and opportunities for trade are limited, then multinationality may oﬀer
a firm the opportunity to exploit superior resources. For example, in the
present context the UK has a high wind resource relative to France, so ce-
teris paribus it might be expected that a firm which owned capacity in both
countries to use WTG more intensively than a firm restricted to France. In
a sector that was until at least the mid 1990s characterized by vertically in-
tegrated monopolies that were either owned by the state or over which the
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state took a proprietorial interest, multinationality might also proxy insti-
tutional flexibility. The dataset used in that chapter ended in 2007, so the
M index used here relates to 2007. This seems safe given the fact that no
multinational firm made the decision to give up their multinational status
during the ten year period covered by the multinationality database.
Absorptive capacity is represented by R&D, which captures the proposition
that firms which devote resources to innovative activity have an enhanced
ability to evaluate, assimilate and apply new information (Cohen and Levin,
1989, Zahra and George, 2002). Absorptive capacity is expected to have a
positive relationship with diﬀusion. Numerous empirical studies support this
expectation, including in the context of intra-firm diﬀusion (Battisti et al.,
2007) and for WTG, Klaassen et al. (2005). Since there are a number of
missing values for the share of R&D in total revenue and the sample size is
already rather small R&D is included as a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the firm conducts in house R&D in 2007, and 0 otherwise. Previous
studies have followed the same strategy. Arguably it is the fact that the firm
conducts the innovative activity not the absolute spend that is important.
Concentration in the domestic market, represented by the two-firm concen-
tration ratio, CR2. Concentration is widely employed as a measure of com-
petitive pressure, though this tendency is explicitly avoided throughout the
thesis. Nevertheless, market structure, e.g. measured by concentration, is an
indicator of the possible level of competitive pressure. Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991) show that even without information on prices or costs, it is possi-
ble to infer the competitive eﬀect of entry in oligopolistic markets, and that
the greatest eﬀect on competition is by the entry of the second and third
firms. The voluminous literature relating market structure and innovation is
ambiguous in its predictions (Gilbert, 2006) though Sidak and Teece (2009)
argue that competitive markets may not generate strong enough signals to
deliver the socially optimum level of innovation. In the absence of a measure
of competition, the eﬀect of concentration in the firm’s domestic market was
captured by the two firm concentration ratio.
Intra-firm learning which is captured by RENEWABLES which takes the
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value of 1 if the firm reports power generation from other renewable tech-
nologies (excluding hydro) and 0 otherwise. Given the special market rules
for renewables, it is possible that a firm that has developed experience in
operating under the distinct renewables rules has lower costs of adopting
other renewables. Evidence from other studies supports this prediction (e.g
Hollenstein and Woerter, 2008, Colombo and Mosconi, 1995), though neither
concerns clean technologies and no empirical study of the intra-firm diﬀusion
of a clean technology could be found. A positive impact on adoption and
intensification is expected.
Industry level variables
Inter-firm learning is captured by ADOPTEARLIER, the number of firms
that had adopted earlier11. A classical barrier to innovation is the inability
of firms to fully internalize the benefits of innovation which then becomes
a positive externality for rival firms, known as spillover eﬀects (Griliches,
1992). An alternative way of thinking about spillovers is as inter-firm learn-
ing. A very recent study that examines learning and spillovers in wind power
provides preliminary evidence that inter-firm learning was positive but small
(Nemet, 2010), but that it was highly activity specific and not generalized.
11Two variants on the variable were tested, the number of firms which had adopted
earlier, and earlier adopters as a proportion of potential adopters, but the parameter
estimates diﬀered little so the count variant was included in the final model.
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Type Variable Description Expected sign
Firm
SIZE Firm size (GW) +/-
MNAT Index of firm multinationality +
R&D Absorptive capacity +
CR2 Competitive pressure +/-
RENEWABLES Inter-firm knowledge base +
Industry
ADOPTEARLIER Spillovers +/-
Dependent variable adoption equation: ADOPT = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise.
Dependent variable intensification equation: INTRAi (logit transformation.)
Table 5.4: Independent variables
5.7 Estimation procedure and empirical re-
sults
An encompassing model was used to jointly estimate inter-firm and intra-
firm diﬀusion of WTG. The Heckman (1979) maximum likelihood selection
procedure was adopted because it permits testing the hypothesis that the
two decisions are independent. This is important because if a firm’s decision
to adopt a new technology, and the decision to increase the proportion of
the technology in their capacity mix are motivated by diﬀerent factors, po-
tentially eﬀective policy mechanisms designed to induce diﬀusion may also
diﬀer.
5.7.1 Econometric model structure and assumptions12
Let y∗2 denote the outcome of interest
13. A second latent variable is denoted
by y∗1 and the outcome y
∗
2 is observed if y
∗
1 > 0. In this case, y
∗
1 determines
whether or not the firm adopts, and y∗2 determines the share of WTG in their
12This section draws extensively on StataCorp (2007, p.561-563) and Cameron and
Trivedi (2009, p.542-543)
13Throughout this section an asterisk denotes a latent variable.
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capacity mix and y∗1 ￿= y∗2.
The two-equation model consists of a selection equation for y1, where
y1 =
1 if y∗1 > 0
0 if y∗1 ≤ 0
and the outcome equation for y2, where
y2 =
y∗2 if y
∗
1 > 0
− if y∗1 ≤ 0
In this set up, y2 is observed only when y
∗
1 > 0. The model is linear with
additive errors so:
y∗1 = x
￿
1β1 + ε1y
∗
2 = x
￿
2β2 + ε2 (5.3)
and ε1 and ε2 may be correlated. The likelihood function for the model is:
L =
￿n
i−1 Pr(y
∗
1i ≤ 0)1−y1if(y2i | y∗1i > 0)× Pr(y∗1i > 0)y1i
The first term is the contribution if y∗1i ≤ 0 since then y1i = 0 and the second
term is the contribution when y∗1i > 0.
5.7.2 Results and discussion
Empirical results are presented in table 5.5. The Heckman ML selection
model jointly estimates adoption and intensification; results for each step are
discussed in turn.
General assessment
The logic of applying an encompassing model is supported by the empirical
results. Firm specific and industry level characteristics are important de-
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terminants of the extent of inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion in 2008. The
Wald test statistic provides evidence that the coeﬃcients on the variables are
significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. The likelihood ratio test has
a p-value of 0.003, therefore the estimated correlation between the errors is
significantly diﬀerent from zero. This means that the hypothesis that the two
parts of the model are independent is rejected, so the decision to intensify
WTG in the capacity mix is not independent of the decision to adopt WTG.
Inter-firm diﬀusion
Multinational firms were more likely to have WTG in their 2008 generation
mix than non-multinationals (significant at the 1% level). In general clean
technologies14 typically flow across borders only if the recipient country has
‘better’ incentives to invest (Popp, 2008), which suggests that MNE’s may
have a role in transferring clean technologies from developed to less developed
and transition economies.
Firms that reported generating power from other renewable technologies
(excluding hydro) were also more likely than those who used only conven-
tional technologies to have WTG in 2008. Power generated from renewable
energy sources (RES) is treated in a diﬀerent way from other power, which
implies that generators familiar with and set-up to deal with one RES are
more likely to invest in others. There is essentially a sunk cost associated
with the first RES technology, so subsequent investments become less costly
and less risky. This implies that reducing the complexity of the interactions
between the RES and standard power regimes may have a positive eﬀect on
the number of firms that adopt WTG.
A statistically significant relationship between firm size and inter-firm
diﬀusion was not found, in contrast to earlier studies which found that
larger firms were more likely to adopt a new technology (e.g. Davies, 1979,
Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993). The prior expectation was that R&D as
a proxy for absorptive capacity would be found to be positively related to
inter-firm diﬀusion in 2008 was confirmed, but the result was not significant.
14Other than some energy eﬃciency technologies.
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Data limitations required R&D to be included as a dummy variable, so it
is possible that a better measure of absorptive capacity may have generated
the expected result. Finally, the two-firm concentration ratio in the firm’s
domestic market again carried a positive but insignificant coeﬃcient.
Intra-firm diﬀusion
The two-firm concentration ratio in the member state of origin is strongly
negatively correlated with intra-firm diﬀusion (at the 0.1% level of signifi-
cance). To put it another way, firms based in countries where the share of
the two largest firms is low are much more likely to have a high proportion
of WTG in their generation mix in 2008. This might be taken to support
theories that suggest that competition is good for innovation, however that
would be to equate market structure with the intensity of competition, which
we have explicitly avoided. We can only say that the absence of monopoly
seems to stimulate intensive investment in WTG.
Smaller firms are more likely to have a high share of WTG in their capac-
ity mix (significant at the 10% level). The (limited) evidence on the eﬀect
of firm size on intra-firm diﬀusion is mixed, but this result is consistent with
Hollenstein and Woerter (2008). The mixed evidence may mean that we
do not yet understand the eﬀect of size on diﬀusion very well, but Battisti
(2008) argued that eﬀective intra-firm information flows stimulate intra-firm
diﬀusion. In which case, we might infer the relationship to be due to less
formal and restrictive practices and greater flexibility found in small firms.
Aggregate diﬀusion
Considering aggregate diﬀusion, a story of intra-firm learning being a crucial
driver of the diﬀusion process seems to emerge. It is apparent that eﬀective
within firm learning and information flows are characteristics of both MNEs
and firms that have more than one RES in their capacity mix. It is also likely
that small firms have fewer barriers to information flows than large firms.
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Explanatory variable Adoption Intensity
Coeﬃcient Standard error Coeﬃcient Standard error
FIRMSIZE1 −0·399 0·686 −2·046∗ 1·122
MULTINATIONALITY 3·767 ∗ ∗ 1·383 0·410 2·138
R&D 0·205 0·708 1·386 1·025
CR2 0·244 0·885 −5·257 ∗ ∗∗ 1·518
ADOPTEARLIER · · −1·782 1·782
RENEWABLES 1·686 ∗ ∗ 0·628 −1·067 0·858
Test statistics
N 38
Censored 12
Uncensored 26
Wald test χ2(6) = 19.40(Prob > χ2 = 0.003)*
Log likelihood -60.88
LR test rho = 0 χ2(1) = 8.53(Prob > χ2 = 0.003)*
Heckman selection ML model.
Dependent variable adoption equation: ADOPT
Dependent variable intensification equation: WTGSHARE
1. Box-Cox transformation.
* indicates significance at 10% level.
** indicates significance at 1% level.
*** indicates significance at 0.1% level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5.5: Results: Inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion of WTG.
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5.8 Conclusion and discussion
Aggregate diﬀusion is a function of the proportion of firms using the tech-
nology (inter-firm diﬀusion) and the proportion of the total capacity mix
(or production) accounted for by the technology (intra-firm diﬀusion). The
evidence presented in this chapter shows that inter-firm diﬀusion was par-
ticularly slow for the first 11 years after the first firm adopted and that in
2008, 26 years after their first commercial use, aggregate diﬀusion of WTG
remained very low at less than 4%. The overall level of diﬀusion was due to
an inter-firm diﬀusion level of 70% and average intra-firm diﬀusion of only
5.4%. It was shown that for only 11% of sample firms was the WTG capacity
share over 20%.
Policy interventions are justified when the actual outcome diverges from
the social optimum, but unfortunately there is no consensus on the social
optimum level of diﬀusion of WTG. However, the broad dimensions of the
requirement for RES technologies can be inferred from, e.g. the EU’s com-
mitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Current installed capacity is very sub-
stantially below the levels required to meet those commitments. While some
analysts may argue that the market will deliver the optimum level of WTG
or any other new technology, it has been shown that the inter-firm of WTG
was very slow, and there is a pressing need to avert dangerous climate change
(Stern et al., 2006). Evidence that waiting will be very costly (e.g. McKinsey,
2009), argues for immediate intervention.
There are two key instruments of diﬀusion policy (Stoneman and David,
1986). The first is intended to speed up the rate of initial adoption by
spreading information. Unfortunately the present analysis is silent on the
importance of information in the adoption decision because the variable cap-
turing the spread of information dropped out due to collinearity. However
existing literature does provide some support for the theory that information
has a positive eﬀect on initial adoption (Mansfield, 1963b), though design of
the policy mechanism must be undertaken with care if public provision of
information is not to crowd out private information provision. The second
set of policies is intended to subsidize the cost of adoption, but again caution
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must be exercised since capital goods suppliers with market power, may be
able to appropriate the subsidy by pricing above marginal cost.
Intra-firm diﬀusion is largely neglected in both theoretical and empiri-
cal literature: diﬀusion analysis generally focuses only on the date of first
adoption, or inter-firm diﬀusion. This would not matter if the two aspects of
diﬀusion were generated by similar processes, but the substantial diﬀerence
between the inter-firm and intra-firm rates identified in this study, suggests
this not to be the case. There are a number of implications. First, the rel-
ative neglect of intra-firm diﬀusion in the literature should be redressed in
order that a fuller understanding of processes that govern intra-firm diﬀusion
can be generated. Second, the joint modelling of inter-firm and intra-firm
diﬀusion has been successful and the approach should be replicated for other
technologies. For example, this approach revealed that the initial decision
to adopt and the decision to increase the WTG share were not independent,
therefore subsidy aimed at inter-firm diﬀusion is likely to have an eﬀect on
intra-firm diﬀusion and vice versa. Since diﬀusion was shown to be largely a
story of intra-firm learning, this suggests that diﬀusion policy should focus
on improving information flows within firms and their abilities to put the
information to good use.
However, these policy implications should be treated with caution because
there are three main shortcomings of the study. First, the data available was
limited to a cross section, though it is obvious that a much fuller under-
standing of the inherently dynamic nature of the diﬀusion process would be
permitted using panel data. This would also alleviate the problems associated
with the small sample size. The second concerns the econometric methodol-
ogy. As discussed, econometric studies of intra-firm diﬀusion are rare, and
the joint modelling of inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion even rarer, so no
consensus on the most appropriate methodology has yet emerged. While
the overall fit and results of the econometric approach adopted here are sat-
isfactory, there remains plenty of scope for experimentation with diﬀerent
econometric strategies. In addition to developing further models of intra-
firm diﬀusion, it would be interesting to conduct a ‘model comparison’ study
in the vein of Neuhoﬀ et al. (2005), though the body of empirical evidence
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available may be too small for this to be of practical use at the present time.
The final shortcoming is that the paper does not account for policy diﬀer-
ences in the member states. While we argued in section 5.2 that the eﬀect of
diﬀerences between individual member state policies is diminished because
our measures of diﬀusion are at the aggregate firm level, it would neverthe-
less be an interesting extension to introduce into the model policy variables
capturing member state policies.
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5.9 Appendix
5.9.1 Box-Cox transformation
The variable is assumed to take the following form:
y = α+ β(x) + ε
then is it linear only if λ = 1 in equation (5.4):
xλ =
xλ − 1
λ
(5.4)
If the variable y is skewed, then ￿= 1. The Box-Cox transformation finds
a value for λ such that xλ has approximately 0 skewness and the eﬃciency
of Ordinary Least Squares estimates are not compromised.
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CHAPTER
SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 Introduction
The EC has a vision of a single internal market in electricity, and has taken
steps to attain that goal by introducing competition into what in most mem-
ber states was a monopolized industry with high levels of state involvement.
Ten years after the EC’s liberalization process began, progress towards the
single market objective was deemed suﬃciently slow to merit a Sector In-
quiry, which found that concentration to be high in many member states.
On this basis of this finding, the EC concluded that competition was insuf-
ficiently intense. Equating competitive pressure and industrial structure is
pervasive in industrial economics, but in reality structure is about more than
concentration; it is determined by both the size distribution of firms and
their number. And competitive pressure is about more than structure; it is
about barriers to entry as well. This thesis has identified and evaluated the
changing nature of the industrial structure of power generation in the EU in
the context of radical sectoral restructuring.
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6.2 The market share matrix
It is surprising that the EC’s single electricity market vision has not stimu-
lated a body of research examining the dimensions of the hypothetical EU
market. The EC themselves seem to have suﬀered a failure of imagination;
the specification of the data to be collected from firms under the Sector
Inquiry omitted data that would have enabled the EC to evaluate market
structure at the EU level. There is no publicly and freely available data
that would permit such an analysis, therefore the market share matrix for
EU power generation was compiled from scratch. The database records the
capacity of 54 leading firms based in the EU over the period 1998 – 2007,
and is highly representative of the EU; matrix firms covered 74% of total EU
installed capacity in 2007.
The matrix is a remarkably flexible and powerful tool for the analysis of
sectoral structure that can be disaggregated at the member state or regional
level. Statistical analysis based on the matrix revealed the dimensions of
the hypothetical EU single market that were to guide the more sophisticated
analysis pursued in later chapters. For example regarding concentration,
it showed that by the end of the period, 3 firms owned 36% of total EU
installed capacity, that concentration at the aggregate EU level had risen
over the period and that the dynamic path of concentration varied very
substantially between ERGEG regions. Examination of the behaviour of
individual firms showed that mean firm size increased, while the number of
competitors declined. Further, the large discrete changes in firms size that
were observed pointed towards the possibility that mergers were important.
6.3 Mergers and the size distribution of firms
at the aggregate EU level
The purpose of this chapter was to examine in detail the rise in aggregate
concentration identified in the matrix chapter, and in particular, the increase
in size of the very largest 39 firms which owned over 80% of total installed
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capacity in their countries of origin. It was shown that the mean size of firms
operating in 2007 was 38% greater than the mean size of those operating in
1998, and using a transition matrix approach, it was shown that firms moved
up the size classes. 20% of firms active in 1998 exited the sector, and all were
acquired by other sample firms.
The relationship between firm size and firm growth was explored in a
stochastic growth model derived from statistical theory, the law of propor-
tionate eﬀect (LPE). This kind of model exposes the links between firm size
and growth and aggregate concentration, so was particularly apposite given
the objectives of the study. Assuming that firm growth follows a random
walk, on average firms grow proportionately to their size and the dispersion
of size increases as a result of random influences. Then concentration in-
creases purely as a function of properties of the distribution. Our results
show that the LPE held for firms that were active throughout the period,
i.e. firms grew roughly in proportion to their size. Therefore some of the
increase in concentration was caused by the properties of the distribution.
However, the temporal path of the HHI was jagged, and statistical anal-
ysis showed that there were large, discrete changes in firm size, which sug-
gested that mergers may be important. The eﬀect of mergers on firm growth
was estimated using a counterfactual technique and for firms operational
throughout the period, it was shown that the majority of growth was ac-
counted for by merger activity. Mergers therefore played an important role
in the observed increase in aggregate concentration.
The main messages of this chapter are that mergers drove almost all the
increase in firm size and reduced the number of large firms, which lead to
an increase in aggregate concentration. It was shown that mobility among
the very largest firms was very low, and that the same firms occupied the
top 5 slots in a ranking of firm size. Taken together, these findings have
implications for competition policy.
Newbery (2007) argues that proposed horizontal mergers in electricity
should be evaluated with respect to both the likely market power eﬀects,
and the possible eﬀect on the structure of sector in the future. This study is
set in the context of the hypothetical single market, and has shown that the
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trend in aggregate concentration has been rising and that mergers exerted an
important influence on the trend. Our results therefore support Newbery’s
argument and emphasize the need for vigilant enforcement of existing com-
petition law, and for the explicit evaluation of the potential dynamic eﬀects
of merger on future sectoral structure. The high degree of politicization in
the sector only serves to reinforce these conclusions.
6.4 Firm multinationality
The focus of this chapter was the detailed analysis of one particular element of
firm strategy, firm multinationality. Two separate questions were addressed:
is the firm multinational? if so, how multinational are they? There are clear
links between firm size and multinationality; firms are large because they
have a large share of capacity in a large home member state, or because
they own assets in other member states, or both. Aggregate firm size was
decomposed in geographical space into its three dimensions: typical share of
country capacity they own, typical size of country in which they operate, and
the extent of multinationality. The use of this analytical device enabled us
to conduct a more refined analysis than would have been possible otherwise.
Two theoretical reasons for firms to ‘go multinational’ were considered; the
specific-asset theory (Caves, 2007) and the market power theory (Hymer,
1960) of which multi-market contact is a variant (Bernheim and Whinston,
1990).
On the initial decision to hold assets in another member state, we found
that both the typical size of the member state in which the firm operates and
the typical share of capacity owned by the firm had a positive influence on the
multinational decision, and that the typical share eﬀect was dominated by
the typical country size eﬀect. As suggested by specific-assets theories of the
MNE, a general ability to organize operations across markets is important.
For example, a firm based in Germany, which has a relatively fragmented
market structure, may be forced develop this ability in order to operate suc-
cessfully at home, which puts them at an advantage relative to a monopolist
when it comes to international expansion. However this reasoning also sug-
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gests that multimarket contact, which facilitates the maintenance of collusive
outcomes, may be a part of the story.
High levels of multinationality are negatively correlated with both typical
country share and typical country size; firms operating in large countries are
less likely to be highly multinational than those operating in small countries,
and monopolists are typically not multinational. A multimarket contact story
again emerges - firms operating in large countries are in regular contact with
rivals, so theoretically may have an enhanced ability to sustain collusive
behaviour without having to resort to intensive multinationality.
Finally, we found that the multinational strategies adopted by generators
have changed since market liberalization. This observation may be explained
by the profit maximizing theory of the firm, whereby the most eﬃcient firms
prosper at the expense of their less eﬃcient competitors. Assuming cost
savings are passed on to consumers, this would enhance social welfare. On
the other hand, the altered the structure of the market may lead to the
increased likelihood of collusive behaviour in the future.
6.5 Inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion of clean
generation technologies: the case of wind.
Tomorrow’s capital stock is the product of decisions made in earlier periods,
and this final substantive chapter concerns a specific element of firm strat-
egy, the decision to invest in a particular clean generation technology, wind
turbine generators (WTG). Our understanding of diﬀusion processes is poor,
and in particular our knowledge of the ways in which new technologies diﬀuse
within firms is very limited. This is at the very least unfortunate given the
pressing need to avert dangerous climate change (Stern et al., 2006).
Patterns of inter-firm and inter-firm diﬀusion were evaluated, and the
analysis revealed that in 2008 approximately 70% of firms had adopted the
technology, though the mean level of intra-firm diﬀusion was only 5.4%. This
disparity is an important finding because our understanding of the diﬀusion
of low carbon technologies is as yet poor, and here we have shown that the
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diﬀusion within the firm is a key barrier to more intense use. This result is
supported by the fact that only 11% of firms were found to have more than
20% of WTG in their capacity mix.
An encompassing model of inter-firm and intra-firm diﬀusion was esti-
mated using a Heckman two-step econometric procedure. Results showed
that the first adoption and intensification decisions were not independent,
herefore policy interventions intended to speed up inter-firm diﬀusion can be
expected to have a positive eﬀect on intra-firm diﬀusion. Multinationals and
firms which were using another renewable generation technology were found
to be more likely to have adopted WTG by 2008, and a high WTG share in
2008 was associated with small firms and with those originating in a member
state where the structure was not monopoly. On the basis of these findings,
it was argued that intra-firm learning is a critical driver of the diﬀusion pro-
cess, and policy interventions should focus on improving the ability of firms
to use information eﬀectively.
6.6 Conclusion
Given the importance of electricity supply to well functioning modern economies,
it is unsurprising that the sector has been subjected to considerable atten-
tion by the EC. Furthermore, the reliance on fossil fuel technologies means
that the sector is responsible for approximately one third of total EU GHG
emissions. The Directorate General for Energy is of the view that “Energy
is what makes Europe tick”1, and together with the Directorate General for
Competition, have driven a far-reaching liberalization agenda intended to
reduce concentration by introducing competition into the generation sector.
For all these reasons, energy policy is at the heart of the EU project, indeed
a leading analyst has declared it to be “a litmus test for the usefulness of the
European Union as an institution” (Roller et al., 2007).
The analysis conducted in the course of this research project does not sug-
gest sectoral reform to have been a resounding success, but rather presents
1Source: DG Energy website homepage, accessed 12/09/2010
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a mixed picture. Leading generators have responded to liberalization by
pursuing growth strategies that have altered the structure of the sector sig-
nificantly. Firm strategies have lead to a sector which has fewer, larger
players which are increasingly multinational. These changes may have en-
hanced welfare relative to the status quo if it is the most eﬃcient firms that
have prospered and if cost savings have been passed on to consumers. On
the other hand, given the objective of the liberalization programme to in-
troduce competition though increasing the number of players, observed firm
behaviour has undermined this objective, and may have increased the likeli-
hood of tacit collusion in the future. The penetration of WTG is less than 4%,
although multinationality is strongly associated with intense use of WTG,
which suggests that firm response to liberalization has had a positive eﬀect
on technology transfer across borders. While WTG is only one RES technol-
ogy, it is nevertheless the most widespread low carbon generation technology
(other than hydro) so penetration is higher for WTG than other RES. Taken
together, installed capacity of RES technologies is far below the level required
if the EU is to meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
This study has for the first time generated a comprehensive picture of the
structure and evolution of the hypothetical single market for power genera-
tion across the EU, and has identified key strategies adopted by the leading
generators in response to the liberalization agenda pursued by the EC. On
the basis of this research, it is not possible to form a judgement on the like-
lihood of the successful formation of a single market in electricity. Such a
judgement would need to be informed by studies of the performance of the
leading firms that have been identified and explored in the course of this
research. However, the knowledge and understanding embodied in the the-
sis is fundamental to a fuller understanding of an industrial sector that is
of critical importance to the continued prosperity of the citizens of the EU.
Furthermore it suggests a potential analytical framework for analysis of other
sectors which share similar characteristics, and for which the ultimate goal
is also a single market, for example telecoms and water.
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6.7 Limitations and future research
The dynamic nature of the research process means that results generated in
any given study motivate questions that cannot be immediately addressed,
perhaps in the interests of retaining focus, or due to resource constraints.
The implication is that most academic research carries limitations, but at
the same time forms the basis for an ongoing research agenda. This thesis
is no exception. The limitations of each chapter were discussed as the thesis
progressed, but in this final section, those that present the most promising
avenues for future research are discussed.
In chapter 3 it was shown that mergers drove almost all the observed
growth in firm size and the reduction in firm numbers, and the results indi-
cated the possibility of the formation of strategic groups. However, pursuing
questions such as how the composition of the groups changed over the sample
period, and exploring for example, the barriers to jumping from one group to
another, was outside the scope of the chapter both because the main focus of
the chapter was to explore firm growth and to evaluate the role of mergers,
and as a result of resource constraints.
The data contained in the market share matrix is suﬃciently rich to sup-
port a more detailed analysis of the sample firms than has already been
achieved. Strategic groups may be explored using cluster analysis, which is
the analysis of groups of observations, where the groups reflect their similari-
ties over several variables. Cluster methods are frequently used as to explore
data and are capable of developing robust typologies which can then form
the basis of further more sophisticated empirical analysis.
The kernel density plot of the size distribution of firms presented in fig-
ure 3.2 was intriguing, and as noted, suggested the possibility that a dual
structure may be emerging in the industry, with a subset of very large firms
breaking away from the rest. This hypothesis could be tested in a stochastic
framework as advocated by Simon and Bonini (1958).
It was shown in chapters 2 and 3 that aggregate concentration within the
hypothetical single market had risen unambiguously over the period. While
preliminary analysis in chapter 2 showed that there was considerable vari-
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ation in concentration at the regional level, no attempt has been made to
estimate the importance to EU concentration, of concentration at the na-
tional level. Clarke and Davies (1983) showed that aggregate concentration
(e.g. at the EU level) may be decomposed into the weighted average of na-
tional concentration and multinationality. It would be interesting to explore
further the identified rise in EU concentration and the relative contributions
of both factors, based on this accounting identity, which is similar to that
employed in chapter 4.
There are many ways in which chapter 5 may be extended, but three in
particular deserve serious consideration. First, in common with the majority
of other studies of diﬀusion, the model was estimated on cross sectional data.
Given the dynamic nature of the diﬀusion process, this is clearly sub-optimal
and so the most obvious next step is to collect data to form a panel. Sec-
ond, the research showed that disaggregating the overall level of diﬀusion
of a new technology revealed very substantial diﬀerences between inter-firm
(70%) and mean intra-firm diﬀusion (5%). This is a new finding which has
implications for policy formation, notably that both components of tech-
nology diﬀusion respond to diﬀerent policy initiatives. The dissagregated
approach therefore appears to be a step forward in improving our currently
poor level of understanding of the diﬀusion process, and may be particularly
valuable where there is substantial public support for new technologies, for
example renewable energy or energy saving technologies.
The third avenue for research in this area is methodological. The em-
pirical modelling of intra-firm diﬀusion is in its infancy, and while the the
Heckman two-step procedure implemented in this study has revealed new
insights, there remain many methodological challenges. In particular, while
the nature of the supplying industry is clearly an important influence on
the process of a technological diﬀusion, it has so far proved very diﬃcult to
introduce supply side factors into current models of diﬀusion. However, we
have started work on a study in which we hope to map the supply side into
diﬀusion models through the use of patent data.
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